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Abstract
Le concept de confiance est un concept sociocognitif qui adresse la
question de l’interaction dans les systèmes concurrents. Quand la
complexité d’un système informatique prohibe l’utilisation de solu-
tions traditionnelles de sécurité informatique en amont du proces-
sus de développement (solutions dites de type dur), la confiance est
un concept candidat, pour le développement de systèmes d’aide à
l’interaction.
Dans cette thèse, notre but majeur est de présenter une vue d’ensemble
de la discipline de la modélisation de la confiance dans les systèmes in-
formatiques, et de proposer quelques modèles logiques pour le développe-
ment de module de confiance. Nous adoptons comme contexte appli-
catif majeur, les applications basées sur les architectures orientées ser-
vices, qui sont utilisées pour modéliser des systèmes ouverts telle que
les applications web. Nous utiliserons pour cela une abstraction qui
modélisera ce genre de systèmes comme des systèmes multi-agents.
Notre travail est divisé en trois parties, la première propose une
étude de la discipline, nous y présentons les pratiques utilisées par les
chercheurs et les praticiens de la confiance pour modéliser et utiliser ce
concept dans différents systèmes, cette analyse nous permet de définir
un certain nombre de points critiques, que la discipline doit aborder
pour se développer.
La deuxième partie de notre travail présente notre premier modèle
de confiance. Cette première solution basée sur un formalisme logique
(logique dynamique épistémique), démarre d’une interprétation de la
confiance comme une croyance sociocognitive [15], ce modele présen-
tera une première modélisation de la confiance. Apres avoir prouvé la
décidabilité de notre formalisme. Nous proposons une méthodologie
pour inférer la confiance en des actions complexes : à partir de notre
confiance dans des actions atomiques, nous illustrons ensuite comment
notre solution peut être mise en pratique dans un cas d’utilisation
basée sur la combinaison de service dans les architectures orientées
services [12].
La dernière partie de notre travail consiste en un modèle de confi-
ance , où cette notion sera perçue comme une spécialisation du raison-
nement causal tel qu’implémenté dans le formalisme des règles de pro-
duction [10]. Après avoir adapté ce formalisme au cas épistémique,
nous décrivons trois modèles basés sur l’idée d’associer la confiance au
raisonnement non monotone. Ces trois modèles permettent respective-
ment d’étudier comment la confiance est générée, comment elle-même
génère les croyances d’un agent et finalement, sa relation avec son con-
texte d’utilisation.
mot-clé: Confiance computationelle, logique modale, règles de pro-
duction, raisonnement causal.
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Abstract
The concept of trust is a socio-cognitive concept that plays an im-
portant role in representing interactions within concurrent systems.
When the complexity of a computational system and its unpredictabil-
ity makes standard security solutions (commonly called hard security
solutions) inapplicable, computational trust is one of the most useful
concepts to design protocols of interaction.
In this work, our main objective is to present a prospective survey
of the field of study of computational trust. We will also present two
trust models, based on logical formalisms, and show how they can
be studied and used. While trying to stay general in our study, we
use service-oriented architecture paradigm as a context of study when
examples are needed.
Our work is subdivided into three chapters. The first chapter presents
a general view of the computational trust studies. Our approach is to
present trust studies in three main steps. Introducing trust theories as
first attempts to grasp notions linked to the concept of trust, fields of
application, that explicit the uses that are traditionally associated to
computational trust, and finally trust models, as an instantiation of a
trust theory, w.r.t. some formal framework. Our survey ends with a
set of issues that we deem important to deal with in priority in order
to help the advancement of the field.
The next two chapters present two models of trust. Our first model
is an instantiation of Castelfranchi & Falcone’s socio-cognitive trust
theory [15]. Our model is implemented using a Dynamic Epistemic
Logic that we propose. The main originality of our solution is the
fact that our trust definition extends the original model to complex
action (programs, composed services, etc.) and the use of authored
assignment as a special kind of atomic actions. The use of our model is
then illustrated in a case study related to service-oriented architecture.
Our second model extends our socio-cognitive definition to an ab-
ductive framework, that allows us to associate trust to explanations.
Our framework is an adaptation of Bochman’s production relations to
the epistemic case. Since Bochman approach was initially proposed to
study causality, our definition of trust in this second model presents
trust as a special case of causal reasoning, applied to a social context.
We end our manuscript with a conclusion that presents how we
would like to extend our work.
Keywords: computational trust, modal logic, production inference
relations, causal reasoning.
ii
Contents
1 Computational trust: a state of the art 5
1.1 What is computational trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.1 Castelfranchi socio-cognitive model of trust . . . 9
1.1.2 Marsh modelization of trust . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.1.3 Other approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Application fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.1 Decision theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2.2 Game theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2.3 MAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3 Trust models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3.1 Social network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.3.2 Probabilistic modelization of trust . . . . . . . . 41
1.3.3 Logical modelization of trust . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.4 Discussion and conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2 Trust in complex actions 55
2.1 Motivation: trust in service compositions . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 ABC: A logic of action, belief and choice . . . . . . . . 56
2.2.1 Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.2 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2.3 Updating models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2.4 Interpretation of formulas and programs . . . . 62
2.2.5 Logic ABC and logic BC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.2.6 Decidability of ABC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3 A logical analysis of trust in ABC . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.3.1 Reducing trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
i
2.3.2 Trust in complex actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.3.3 Reasoning tasks involving trust . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Case study: searching for accommodation . . . . . . . 79
2.4.1 CROUS services presentation . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.2 Beliefs and goals of the student . . . . . . . . . 82
2.4.3 Trust analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.5 Conclusion and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3 Nonmonotonic trust operator 88
3.1 Motivation: NMR and its view of trust . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2 Production inference relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.1 Regular production inference . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.2 Abducive production inference . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3 Epistemic production inference relations . . . . . . . . 100
3.3.1 Regular epistemic production inference . . . . . 105
3.3.2 Abductive epistemic inference . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.4 Nonmonotonic vision of trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.4.1 Core based trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4.2 Trust as an elemental belief . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.4.3 Contextual trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4 Discussion and conclusion 116
1
Introduction
The acceptance of Internet a mainstream medium of communication
triggered a shift paradigm on what is considered an everyday interac-
tion. New types of services are proposed to users everyday, providing
them with new means to simplify everyday tasks, and generating new
business models to be exploited by service providers.
In our work, we are interested in services that provide us with func-
tionalists related to the construction of virtual communities of users
in order to share and cooperate in an effortless way. By virtual com-
munities we encompass such notions as social networks or auctioning
sites.
Such new types of interaction bring with it new kinds of risks that
the interactors need to handle in order to prevent any harm, espe-
cially regarding application that can threaten the privacy of the user
or involve him in fraudulent financial transaction.
Such issues are exasperated by the willing of the service provider to
propose to his clients, an interaction experience that mimics his "real
life" interactions. While this way of thinking applications simplifies
the user interaction by providing him a mental vocabulary to interact
(like putting items in a shopping cart), such analogy often tricks the
user to overshadow the risks behind his choices, by relying on his judg-
ment on criteria unsuited for online interaction, providing new type of
vulnerabilities to be exploited in cyber crimes.
Computational trust is the field of computer science that tries to
tackle such issues by applying principles that we follow in our day to
day real interaction to assess risks and decide upon it on how to act in
virtual communities. The goal of this field of study is to adapt trust
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principles, in addition to classical security solutions, in order to offer an
online interactor a coherent and meaningful set of heuristics, to choose
his course of action. This task is often presented as complementary to
traditional (hard) security approaches.
However, trust is a concept that is both difficult to use, and difficult
to describe. A trust model can be implemented in different theories,
while referring to different contexts of use. To cope with such difficul-
ties, many trust models are identified with notions related to quality
of interaction, notion that is related to the service provider ability to
provide what is is expected from the advertised service, given the re-
sources that are available to him. This interpretation of trust skips
in the same way the notion of deception and malicious behavior that
trust is supposed to help us deal with.
Our work is positioned within the view that malicious behavior is
an important subject of a trust study. To deal with it, we argue that a
meaningful trust model should take into account the cognitive nature
of the interactor, and the possible deceptive intentions of the others.
Our work is divided into three main chapter. Our first chapter takes
the form of a global survey on computational trust that presents differ-
ent perspective on how to model trust, by presenting the modelization
process as composed of three parts. At first, an intermediary general
trust theory need to be defined. Such semi-formal characterization is
conducted either by describing trust properties, or relating trust to a
set of concepts that are used to understand how trust is used. While
presenting a set of trust theories, we emphasize two of the most influen-
tial trust definitions that we encountered, Castelfranchi & Falcone [24]
and Marsh [49] models. The second step in modeling trust is to specify
a field of application, as a way to describe both the observation and
a priori assumption, that are used to assess trust, and the decision
process that will use trust to guide interaction. The third step cor-
responds to the selection of a framework in which a trust theory will
be instantiated, in this section we present trust models, categorized by
such framework of applications.
The second and third chapters presents our contribution to the filed
in the form of two logic-based trust models. While both our models
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are designed to deal with interaction in open multi-agent systems, our
two models are based on different view of computational trust.
Our first trust model is an instantiation of Castelfranchi & Falcone’s
socio-cognitive trust theory [15]. Our model is implemented using
a dynamic epistemic logic that we propose. The main originality of
our solution is the fact that our trust definition extends the original
model to complex action (program’s, composed services, etc.) and the
use of authored assignment as a special kind of atomic actions that
described the propositonal changes that an action will conduct, within
its syntax. The use of our model is then illustrated in a case study
related to service-oriented architecture.
Our second model extends our socio-cognitive definition of trust to
an abductive framework. By doing so we can associate to a trust status
explanations of such state, providing a better way to assess risks related
to the current interaction. Our abductive framework is an epistemic
adaptation of Bochmans’s production relations [10]. Since Bochman
approach was initially proposed to study causality, we feel that it is
suited to describe our second view of trust as a special case of causal
reasoning, applied to a social context.
We then conclude with a summary of our work, and present how
we will extend our results in future studies, in a way that further our
understanding of the concept of trust.
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Chapter 1
Computational trust: a
state of the art
Trust is one of the most studied concepts related to interaction. A com-
monly accepted view of trust defines it as a notion, used by humans to
lower the complexity of decision making in complex social interaction,
where being lethargic would be harmful. This view inspired different
disciplines to use trust in different systems of interaction. Hence, trust
studies can be found in sociology, philosophy, or economics, but also
in industrial design, artificial intelligence and computer science (which
is our main field of interest).
Computational trust, is the field of research in computer science, that
tries to apply trust principles, to virtual communities, where "virtual
communities" is the umbrella term that encompasses social networks,
engineering paradigms (like Service Oriented Architecture), etc. In
such applications (as was pointed out in [39]) non expert users, may
lack training in assessing what courses of action lead to successful in-
teractions. This is mainly due to the lack of understanding of both
risks in interaction and metrics that one may use to assess trust in
the different available actions. Implementing trust based is one of the
most widely adopted solutions, to find such metrics and assess risks,
to equip (human or automated) users with what is needed to make
informed choices.
Since our goal is to provide a comprehensive view of the current state
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of computational trust studies, we need to define a set of questions that
will guide our study. Such questions will help us delimit our scope of
study and define our objectives. This step is essential when dealing
with such rich and versatile concept trust is. Thus, our goal is to
answer the following questions:
What are the criteria to ensure that a trust model, is com-
patible with a given context of application? One should
be aware of limits of trust based solutions and have strict criteria
to distinguish applications where trust can be of some help from
those where it does not. Also, depending on its uses, trust can be
related to different elements of a computational system.
How to conduct a study in computational trust? In order to cap-
italize upon past studies, one needs to define a modular method-
ology. Such methodology should help one reuse past results and
evaluate ones models w.r.t. others propositions. To do so, we need
to take a look at models, properties, common applications and
testbeds. Furthermore, defining a set of best practices can guide a
computer designer or a researcher, on how to start building trust
based computation systems in a sound manner.
What are the challenges that need to be faced to study trust?
either as a follow-up to influential work or as a response to some ap-
plicative needs, researchers interested in computational trust have
identified challenges to tackle first, in order to advance the field.
identifying those challenges is a crucial element that needs to be
dealt with in order to make our study as significant as possible.
Different surveys tried to answer those questions (in more or less
depth). One of the most complete was presented by Marsh in [49],
where the goal of the author was to define a trust theory, simple and
general enough, to be used as a starting point for other researchers (us-
able in social science studies for example) to construct more complex
trust models in an incremental way. Thus, Marsh’s inquiry about trust
is more prospective in the sense that he focused on answering our first
two questions (what is trust and what methodology one should follow
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to study it). on the other hand Jøsang presented in [39], a survey
that focuses on uses of trust in electronic commerce. By restricting
the context of study, he was able to identify categories of trust models,
suitable or not for such application. Finally, Sierra & al. in [63] struc-
tured their study around a set of dimensional aspects that describe
trust models w.r.t. to the type of observations that they take as input
and their applicative nature. They were able to present a comprehen-
sive comparison of different trust models, and discuss their applicative
contexts.
By comparison, our survey is motivated by the vision that a theory
of trust is mainly shaped by choices that are inherent to the way trust
will be used. Such choices can be categorized under three main themes:
Trust Construction: In almost all studies that we encountered, the
starting point of view of the inquiry, is the social notion of trust.
In order to define its computational counterpart, we often restrict
the properties and the set of concepts that trust is related to. This
process is the first step to define a trust model.
Theory of formalization: Once a conceptual view of trust is defined,
a theory of formalization needs to be selected. Choosing a theory
instead of another, may change the nature of the concept (from
a theoretical or practical point of view), a simple example of this
would be the formalization of Castelfranchi & Falcone trust that
was conducted in a logical framework in [33] and in a probabilistic
framework in [52]. Our approach differs from this two approaches
mainly by taking studying trust in complex actions, and taking in
account more then one intervening (trustee) in the interaction.
Application framework: Formalizing the context of application de-
fines another restriction upon a definition of trust, where assump-
tion like assuming failure of interaction due to the context, taking
into account the capacity of interactors to achieve some tasks or
the eventuality of malicious behavior, may change the semantic be-
hind our trust model, and consequently what kind of interactional
issues it tackles.
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These three aspects of trust correspond to the following three sec-
tions, with the remark that the theories of application, will be pre-
sented before presenting the theories of formalization of trust, and this
in order to introduce first the problems that computational trust is
supposed to resolve, before presenting how trust models work.
This chapter will then be concluded by a a discussion that summa-
rize our thoughts about the field of trust studies and presents a set of
challenges, that we deem crucial, to the well advancement of the field.
1.1 What is computational trust
Current technologies enable new ways of cooperations. In our daily
life, it is virtually impossible to stay away from at least, some sort of
virtual communities. Unfortunately, our inadequacy to asses risks and
malicious behavior under virtual contexts, grows up with the richness
of available services [63].
Security engineers try to deal with this problem defining mechanisms
that protect users, predict risks, or at least minimize the negative ef-
fects of bad interactions. By their very own nature, such mechanisms
show their limitation when implemented in open system. Using Inter-
net the main representative of such systems, assumptions like secure
communication channel, or the presence of a central authority, that will
ensure the correct execution of a policy of interaction and will validate
transaction can typically not be assumed. Also, traditional security
solutions are often constructed to deal with a limited set of possible
threats, whose relevance depends on the resources and time that the
system designer invests in the design of the solution. Furthermore,
threats that target the human factor in computational systems are the
most difficult to deal with [4]. This inadequacy of traditional security
methods calls for a new approach toward security, that is, more suited
to the complexity of current computational systems.
This is where the notion of trust enters the scene, as a way to tackle
traditional security drawbacks. The goal of any trust study is to find
mechanisms, additional to traditional or (’hard’) security mechanisms,
that mimic human social interactions and (in particular) trust assess-
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ment and thereby help us avoid, or at least minimize the risks of bad
interactions [39].
The difficulty to characterize trust is inherent to the properties that
such informal concept exhibits. Some of these difficulties can be sum-
marized into:
• the need to describe the relations that exist between trust and
other cognitive concepts like regrets, rationality and awareness
(defined as the ability of the agent to observe the context of inter-
action). The more concepts are taken in account in a trust model,
the more that model would be complex to study and implement;
• the necessity to define formal objects, that quantify an agent trust
state, in a way that is pertinent to a decisional framework. For
example reducing trust to a probability of successful interaction
may seem a little too abstract to be used in many application with
intelligent interactors. Knowing that a trust formalization is often
used with different decisional processes; and
• finally, the most problematic element is to define a model of trust
whose impact upon an interactional system can be identified and
studied. Proving that using trust in a given situation would impact
positively the experience of the interactor, is a very difficult task
to fulfill.
In what will follow, we will present a set of trust definitions, relevant
for —but not limited to—the notion of computational trust in open
systems. We will emphasize two of the most influential trust defini-
tions that we encountered, the Castelfranchi & Falcone [24] and the
Marsh [49] models.
1.1.1 Castelfranchi socio-cognitive model of trust
The main goal of Castelfranchi & Falcone (henceforth abbreviated
C&F ), is to deal with delegation in online interaction. C&F argued
that the future of e-commerce is closely related to helping interactor
asses the current risk state of any given interaction, which can only be
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possible by defining a set of mechanisms that would construct a simple
abstraction to the current interaction.
The C&F approach emphasizes the strong relation between trust and
delegation. They rely on the view that trust is the mental background
of delegation. In other words, the decision that an agent (the truster)
takes, to delegate a task to an other agent (the trustee), is conditioned
by some specific beliefs and goals. This mental state is what they call
trust.
According to C&F, trust is a predicate Trust(i, j, α, ϕ), that de-
scribes the trust that an agent i (called the truster) has in an agent j
(called the trustee), in achieving one of i’s goals ϕ, by executing the
action α. such trust is observed if:
1. i has the goal ϕ;
2. i believes that j is capable to do α;
3. i believes that j has the power to achieve ϕ by doing α and
4. i believes that j intends to do α.
For example, if i trusts j to send him a book B that he bought, then
(1) i’s goal is to possess B, and i believes that (2) j is capable to send
B, (3) that j’s sending B will result in i possessing B (i.e., that the
post delivery will not loose the book), and finaly (4) that under the
condition that j receives the payment, j has the intention to send B.
C&F trust model is based on a set of assumptions, used to concep-
tualize the notion of trust [14]:
Assumption 1: Only a cognitive agent can trust an other agent: we
cannot talk about trust without implying a beliefs and goals of the
truster.
Assumption 2: Trust is a mental state, that describes a complex at-
titude of an agent i toward the capability (or the context of exe-
cution) and the willingness of an agent j to achieve i’s goals, by
performing an action. We note that this does not imply that the
agent j is necessary cognitive: one can trust a chair to hold him if
one sits down on it.
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Assumption 3: Trust is the mental counterpart of delegation, where
delegation is perceived as a social construct.
C&F observe that future business models and technological advances
in communication, will put the human element as a central part of dis-
tributed artifical intelligence, or what we call now multi-agent system
(mas). Thus, mas will be a predominant framework to either simulate
or to implement such applications [24].
In such context, users loss of landmark to distinguish good from bad
interactions, or even to assess risks behind their choices, justifies the
use of trust, as one of the key elements in application fields such as
electronic commerce [16].
In order to illustrate the use of their model in a decision framework,
C&F described a simple extension of their model in [15], where they
define the notion of graded trust. This notion of graded trust was used
in a decision tree to implement delegation problems.
While they decompose trust into more basic concepts, C&F do not
use a specific notion of belief, neither a way to compute quantifications
of a graded version of the different concepts involved in the definition.
Adapting the C&F model of trust to different contexts of application
and to different background theories was attempted in further studies,
the most notable being:
A probability model proposed by Yves Demizeau [52] which used a
Bayesian network to concatenate the different beliefs components
of C&F definition, into a probability-based trust quantification.
A formalization based on modal logic was presented in [33], where the
trust ingredients of the C&F model are decomposed in more fine
grained ingredients, implemented in the Belief, Desire, Intention
(BDI) framework.
A possibilistic model was proposed in [19].
This implementations will be detailed in the next sections. We also
note that the trust model presented in chapter 2 of this work, is also
a formalization of this definition.
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1.1.2 Marsh modelization of trust
The model proposed in [49] by Marsh, is one of the earliest models of
computational trust. The main goal of this model is to propose a trust
theory, upon which different disciplines, including non technical ones,
like social sciences, can formalize their own vision of trust.
The Marsh model only takes into account direct interaction. It
defines trust as a numerical value, generally between −1 and 1, that
can refer to three types of trust:
Basic trust which models the general trusting disposition of the truster,
independently of the identity of the trustee. It is calculated from
all the experiences accumulated by the truster. Good experiences
lead to a greater disposition to trust, and vice versa. The author
uses the notation T tx to represent the trust disposition of the truster
x at time t.
General trust is the common notion of trust that the truster asso-
ciates to a trustee but in a context free manner (as opposed to the
C&F definition presented before). The notation Tx(y)t denotes the
quantification of the trust that x has toward y at time t, without
any context of interaction in mind.
Situational trust quantify the amount of trust that one agent has in
another, taking into account a specific situation. The utility of the
situation, its importance and the General trust are the elements
considered in this definition in order to calculate Situational trust.
Marsh presented the following basic formula to calculate this type
of trust:
Tx(y, α)t = Ux(α)t × Ix(α)t × T̂x(y)t
where x is the truster, y the trustee and α the situation at time t.
Ux(α)t represents the utility x gains from α, Ix(α)t is the impor-
tance of the situation α for agent x and T̂x(y)t is the new estimation
of general trust after the current interaction; i.e., if t is the current
time, the truster x will aggregate all situations Tx(y, α′)t
′, with
θ < t′ < t and α′ similar or identical to the present situation α. θ
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and t define the temporal frame that the agent considers. Only the
experiences within that interval of time will be taken into account
for the aggregation.
In order to define T̂x(y) the author proposes three statistical meth-
ods: the mean, the maximum and the minimum. Each method is
identified with a different type of truster: the optimistic, that takes
the maximum trust value from the last t − θ experiences that he
had, the pessimistic, that uses the minimum trust value, and the
realistic, that calculates the value as an average value using the
formula T̂x(y) = 1|A|
∑
α∈A Tx(y, α), where A is the set of situations
similar to the present situation α available from the last frame of
time.
As presented by Marsh, these trust values are used by the truster
to decide if it is worth to cooperate with the trustee or not. But a
such decision mechanism needs to take in account other parameters,
like the importance of the action to be performed, the risk associated
to the situation and the perceived competence of the trustee.
Marsh introduces also two mechanisms for trust deprecation, which
are reciprocation and deprecation over time. Reciprocation implements
the idea that if an agent does not reciprocate a cooperative behavior,
our trust toward him should decrease. Deprecation over time is self
explanatory (over time and without interaction, trust over less tested
trustee decreases).
Marsh defines a decision process to choose between cooperate or
not (a binary choice). The truster decision is based on the notion of
threshold of interaction.
We recall that Marsh’s main goal was to define a theory of trust that
can be extended and adapted to specific situations. To do so, Marsh
followed Karl Popper’s principles to define scientific theories [49]. Marsh
does not see his trust model (or theory) as a definitive one, but hoped
to define a model that furthers our understanding of trust, and helps
others reuse it by being:
• Circumscriptive, by delimiting the context of study,
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• Simple, by following the Occam’s Razor,
• Repeatable in different context of study, and
• Flexible, by allowing to link it to further concepts.
As a result, Marsh pursued his study in [48] by relating trust to the
concepts of forgiveness and regret after bad interaction.
In contrast to Castelfrenchi & Falcone’s model which define trust in
term of decomposition into more primitive concepts, Marsh’s theory
of trust is more interested in its relations to other identified concepts
relevant to interaction. Defining types of trust allows to use different
sets of properties and related concept, depending on the context of
application.
1.1.3 Other approaches
Different studies of trust proposed a characterization of the concept to
suit some applicative context. Some of the most notable one that we
encountered are:
Adum proposed a trust model based on risk in decision making [43].
Using McKnight and Chervany’s work, he defines trust as the
extent to which one party is willing to depend on somebody, or
something, in a given situation with a feeling of relative security,
even though negative consequences are possible. This definition is
adopted to see trust as a concept that is situational and related
to risks. This definition of trust is applied to financial transac-
tion. By restricting the context of application the author is able
to quantify risk (using classical gambling theory) by defining the
expected monetary value EV of the interaction as:
EV = I
i=1∑
n
piGi (1.1)
where pi is the probability of outcome i and Gi is the gain factor
on the monetary investment I in case of outcome i.
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Figure 1.1: The taxonomy of Pinyol Trust language
Upon this definition, Adum identifies some risk attitude, together
with risk functions, that depend on the context of interaction, This
models assumes a binary outcome i ∈ {s, f}. with Gs ∈ [0,+∞]
being the gain factor (associated to the success outcome s ) and
Gf ∈ [−1, 0] considered as the loss factor associated to the failing
outcomes f .
The expected gain is then defined as:
EG = pGs + (1− p)Gf
= p(Gs −Gf) +Gf (1.2)
RepAge: In [56], reputation and trust mechanisms are defined as a
control artifact, aimed to ensure well-behaving behavior by pro-
moting a certain type of interaction within a society(of agents), by
rewarding good behaving agents. In this model, trust is not just a
score, but a mental image constructed by the truster. Such mental
image corresponds to a set of beliefs about the future performance
of the trustee. Those images (corresponding to the notion of role
in game theory) and beliefs are ordered within an ontology of con-
cepts(figure 1.1).
The ontology defined by Pinyol is a set of related beliefs(semantically
described as a set of atomic predicates) that have some social val-
uation (meaning that an observation can be used to assert if a the
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predicate is true or false), those beliefs are divided into simpleBe-
lief and Metabelief (a belief about other agent beliefs).
In such ontology, complex concepts (like trust and reputation), are
constructed using other concepts that can be evaluated.
The European Commission Joint Research Center (ECJRC)
defines trust as the property of a business relationship, such that
reliance can be placed on the business partners and the business
transactions developed with them [75].
Norton Deutsch presented a descriptive definition of trust applied
to psychology [22] that is very similar to Von Neumann & Mor-
genstern definition of rationality. The definition goes as follows: "
When an individual (the truster) is confronted with an ambiguous
path, that may lead to two outcomes (Va+) and (Va-), where the
first outcome is perceived as beneficial and the second one is per-
ceived as harmful. If he decides to interact while perceiving that
the outcome depends on the behavior of another individual (the
trustee), then we say that the truster trusts the trustee."
As Deutsch states, this definition is descriptive. It underlines the
subjectivity of trust, by associating to it two dimensions: our util-
ity function and how we perceive the outcome utility in one hand,
and our point of view of the situation (or our capacity to acquire
and use observation to derive our subjective trust) in the other
hand.
Deutsch was one of the first to note that trust is mostly about how
agents use observations (or objective knowledge of a situation) to
generate subjective assumptions that define the state of trust of
an agent, toward some future interaction, meaning as he puts it,
that "People (and here, we include agents) are in their own ways
psychological theorists and tend to make assumptions about the
behavior of others."
Niklas Luhmann studied trust in a more practical way, compared
to Deutsch, using a study of the prisoner dilemma. Luhmann
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presented trust as a sociological emergent artifact, meant to re-
duce the complexity of society, where the complexity related to
the number of variables that need to be taken in account in or-
der to have a deterministic vision of the world is so high, that an
individual needs to reduce such description in order to adapt to
his surrounding. Trust is then one of those abstractions, meant to
handle risks [46].
Diego Gambetta’s definition of trust is one of the most influential.
Trust is defined as the threshold of the subjective probability with
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will
perform a particular action, both before he monitors the action and
in a context in which it affects his own actions. This definition
is the basic foundation upon which the Castelfranchi & Falcone
definition was built to handle trust in delegation.
1.2 Application fields
As announced in the introduction of this survey, we will now present a
set of application fields and theoretical framework, in which trust plays
a crucial role. The fact the current section precedes the section where
we talk about trust models, is our way to emphasize that trust studies
are highly influenced by their application framework, and that trust
formalization, is only justifiable if we can show that using it under that
context, enhances the performance of the system.
Now the notion of usefulness of a trust study, as the following section
will show, can be either directly observed in its implementation, by
solving some security or performance issues (as a heuristic, a security
policy or a protocol of communication), or it can allow us to understand
furthermore how trust and related concepts can be used in some social
setting (by means of simulation and prediction models of virtual and
real communities).
By an application field, we mean a systematic description of a con-
text of interaction. This definition covers for example social and peer-
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to-peer networks, service based applications, in which cognitive agents 1
observe and interact with each other, in order to achieve common or
concurrent goals. The main interest in such systems, are related to
how agents will decide to interact.
Once an application field is defined, trust is added to the system
by identifying it with a heuristic agents use in their interaction proto-
col. In this setting, the goal of a trust study is to understand how a
trust model affects the behavior of the system (hopefully by increasing
the performance of that system, for example by decreasing the overall
number of failed interaction interactions are more frequent then Failed
one).
Integrating trust in an applicative field, can be done in different
ways that affects the system in different manners. We identify three
of these effects:
• Direct effects, where trust will be used by a truster agent, as a
way to lower the indeterminism of his perception of the system,
and provide some insights on how to succeed in more (if not all)
his interaction,
• Indirect effects, which model the effect of adding trust for both the
truster and the trustee. While the truster will integrate trust in
his interaction protocol, the trustee will also adapt his protocol of
interaction if he would like to continue cooperating with the other
agents. The perception of trust will then act as a deterrent, since
trust perception influences the utility of trustee agents (especially
perceivable in systems with monetary outcomes). Finally,
• Recursive effects, as the most complex possible integration of trust:
the truster, by knowing that the trustee understands that trust
is a component of the truster interaction protocol, may use this
information to learn some things about the inner mechanics that
govern the trustee, or use it to simplify interaction (for example by
taking advantage of trust to minimize the cost of usual verification
1We use the term cognitive agent here loosely as a synonym of a complex agent
those behavior is not entirely known by the other agents of the systems
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on the trustee competences). Meanwhile, the trustee may use this
perception either to manipulate how he is perceived in the system
to look more trustworthy (in harming scenarios, this is often done
with the help of accomplices agents and their recommendations).
Defining which sort of trust integration may give different type of
results depends on the system, and may be more or less suited to some
application fields.
In the remaining of this section, we will present a set of frameworks
used to model such systems, where for each system, we will try to
emphasize how trust can modify interaction protocols, both for the
truster and the trustee, and how we can measure the impact of such a
modification.
1.2.1 Decision theory
Decision theory, in a large sens, encompasses a set of fields, interested
in characterizing decision making processes. In other words, decision
theory is concerned with goal directed behavior in the presence of op-
tions.
Applications of decision theory range from economy to statistics,
passing by psychology, political and social science, to philosophy. This
plethora of application fields explains the interdisciplinary nature of
modern decision theory.
A decision theory can be either normative or descriptive. Normative
approaches study how decisions should be made (given some notion of
rationality), while a descriptive approach is more interested in how
decision are actually made.
The use of norms is the main way a decision theorist describes the
context of a decision problem. The notion of norm is not restricted to
the notion of rationality, but refers as any type of constrains (usually
social, political, ethical, etc.) that are used as a foreground for the
process of choosing between different options. Such sets of norms are
meant to be used as external variable of the decision study.
Our interest in this survey, is when those norms are partially defined.
Such assumption has to be made when we are interested in decision
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making under uncertainty. As most of trust definitions showed in the
last section, such is where trust can be of use.
A decision theory is characterized by:
• a representation of the notion of alternative options,
• a representation of the preferences between such options (quanti-
tative or qualitative assessment), and
• the set of principles (or rules) used to make the decision.
1.Representing alternatives Representing alternatives can be done
using different spaces. The commonly used ones are alternatives,
states of nature, and decision matrices.
Alternatives: Alternatives are defined as courses of action that
are available to the decision maker at the time of the decision.
The set of alternatives can be more or less well-defined. The
set of possible alternatives can be either open (new alternatives
are discovered over time), or closed (static). We can divide
decisions with closed alternative sets into two categories: those
with voluntary and those with involuntary closure. In cases
of voluntary closure, the decision maker has himself decided
to close the set (as a first step in the decision). In cases of
involuntary closure, closure has been imposed by others or by
impersonal circumstances. It is commonly assumed that the
set of alternatives is closed and that its elements are mutually
exclusive.
States of nature The effect of a decision depends not only on
our choice of an alternative and how we carry it through. It
also depends on factors outside of the decision maker’s control.
Some of these external factors are known, they are the back-
ground information that the decision maker assumes. Others
are unknown. They depend on what other persons will do, and
features off nature that are unknown to the decision maker. As
an example, consider the decision to whether or not to go to
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an outdoor concert. The outcome (whether I will be satisfied
or not) will depend both on natural factors (the weather) and
on the behavior of other human beings (how well the band
performs). In decision theory, it is common to summarize the
various unknown external factors into a number of cases, called
states of nature.
Decision matrices The standard format for the evaluation-choice
routine in (individual) decision theory is that of a decision ma-
trix. In a decision matrix, the alternatives open to the decision
maker are tabulated against the possible states of nature. The
alternatives are represented by the rows of the matrix, and the
states of nature by the columns. Mainstream decision theory is
almost exclusively devoted to problems that can be expressed
using utility matrices. While, most modern decision theoretic
methods require numerical information, in many practical de-
cision problems we have much less precise value information
(perhaps best expressed by an incomplete preference relation).
However, it is much more difficult to construct methods that
can deal effectively with non-numerical information.
2.Representing preferences Using preferences helps to define a no-
tion of order among alternatives. Given a preference rule, their is
different ways to choose between alternatives:
1. An alternative is (uniquely) best if and only if it is better than
all other alternatives. If there is a uniquely best alternative,
choose it. There are cases in which no alternative is uniquely
best, since the highest position is shared by two or more alter-
natives. In this case, the obvious solution is to pick one of the
alternatives, no matter which. In a more general setting the
next rule can be used:
2. An alternative is (among the) best if and only if it is at least
as good as all other alternatives. If there are alternatives that
are best, pick one of them. However, there are cases in which
not even this modified rule can be used to guide decision mak-
ing. An example would be cyclic preferences relations. In
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those cases, rationality criteria such as transitivity are often
not useful to guide decisions because for a cyclic and transitive
relation all choices are equal (or incomparable).
3.Principles of decision Different principles for decision making were
proposed over time. One can cite the Condorcet methods that
uses a three steps decision process that refines at each step, the
available alternatives to choose from, Modern sequential models, or
Non-sequential models. To study the relation between trust and
decision theory, we focus our attention on those related to the two
most predominant one, utility maximization, Expected utility and
Bayesianism.
Utility maximization The rule of maximization is almost en-
dorsed in a universal manner. Once the utility of the decision
maker is numerically represented, the basic rule of utility max-
imization is simple to apply: choose the alternative with the
highest utility. If more than one alternative has the highest
utility, pick one of them (no matter which).
The use of the rule of maximization, is justified mostly in eco-
nomic theory, by assuming that individuals maximize their
benefits, as measured in money. Utilitarian moral theory also
postulates that individuals should maximize the utility result-
ing from their actions.
This approach have various withdraw related to the difficulty
to design a numerical utility function for the decision maker,
while in most real cases, one can act in an irrational manner.
To cope with such withdraws, we often assume certain assump-
tions on the decision maker, these assumptions gave raise to the
expected utility method for decision-making, that we present
in the next item.
Expected utility Presented as the major paradigm in decision-
making under uncertainty, expected utility (EU) theory, as-
signs to each alternative, a weighted average of its utility val-
ues under different states of nature, and the probabilities of
22
these states are used as weights. This is why EU is called in
some cases probability-weighted utility theory. This also means
that in order to calculate expectation values, one must have
access to reasonably accurate estimates of objective probabil-
ities. In some applications of decision theory, these estimates
can be based on empirically known frequencies. Such assump-
tion is in many cases too strong to be significant in practice,
especially when one can only construct subjective probabili-
ties based on ones own limited observation. The reliability of
probability estimations depends on how small is the difference
between objective probabilities and subjective ones. This rela-
tion between objective and subjective probabilities was one of
the main reasons to develop the Bayesian approach.2
Baysianism approach to decision making Expected utility the-
ory with both subjective utilities and subjective probabilities
is commonly called Bayesian decision theory, or Bayesianism.
The idea behind this paradigm is to take in account the subjec-
tive nature of decision making. In such paradigm, the decision
maker will follow three main principles:
• The decision maker has a coherent (in the mathematical
sense) set of probabilistic beliefs.
• The set of probabilistic beliefs of the decision maker is com-
plete. In other words, to each proposition, the decision
maker can associate a subjective probability.
• When acquiring a new evidence, the Bayesian decision maker
changes his beliefs in accordance with his conditional prob-
abilities, where a conditional probability P (A | B), denotes
the probability of the proposition A knowing B, P (A) de-
notes then the probability of A, given everything that we
know. with:
P (A|B) = P (A ∧B)/P (B)
2To be noted that while utility maximization applies to deterministic contexts,
expected utility is seen as a generalization of this principle to contexts with uncer-
tainty
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as the only rationality criteria (according to Savage [64]).
• Finally, the decision maker chooses the option with the
highest expected utility.
Bayesianism is more popular among statisticians and philoso-
phers than among more practically oriented decision scientists.
An important reason for this is that it is much less operative
than most other forms of expected utility due to the set of as-
sumptions that it requires. Also, theories based on objective
utilities and/or probabilities more often give rise to predic-
tions that can be tested. It is much more difficult to ascertain
whether or not Bayesianism is violated.
The drawbacks of decision theory are inherent to how it is used
in practice, for example the use of closed sets of alternatives is not
suited for the kind of application fields that we are assuming here. In
virtual communities, new ways of interaction (and sadly, new mischiefs)
are discovered by the user of the system, during its entire life cycle.
Assuming the possibilities of interaction is a closed set, especially when
defining the security policies of the system, is not a viable assumption.
Another impracticality of decision theory, is that it relies on numer-
ical utility function, which are difficult estimate, and prone to error.
Introducing trust in decision theory framework can be done in dif-
ferent manners. The first way is to perceive trust as a social normative
notion. In this case, trust is an external input of the decisional system,
upon which we can rely in defining the decision process. Such aspects
are mainly found in economics and the theory of organizations, with
little to no study available for computational trust.
Another way to see trust, is as an intermediary process in decision
making, that simplifies the representation of the alternatives, the space
of states of nature. In this case, trust would encapsulate the expertise
of the decision maker to leave only in the description of the context of
interaction, elements that are pertinent to choose the best alternative.
Such uses are associated to probabilistic trust models (which will be
presented in the next section). Also, Castelfranchi & Falcone used their
trust definition to define a decision making process based on decision
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trees and threshold of interaction [24]. This implementation represent
a typical use of this principle.
In the next subsection, we will present Game theory as an applicative
framework for trust models. It is worth mentioning that Game theory
can be seen as part of decision theory, but we argue that it deserves a
study by itself due to the tremendous body of work related to the use
of trust in this framework.
1.2.2 Game theory
Trust has been extensively studied in economics, and in the context
of game theory in particular. The usual game theoretic framework for
analyzing trust is that of repeated games, in which some players are
uncertain about the payoff structures of their opponents.
Such framework encompass the two major notions that justify the
use of trust: uncertainty upon the other players’ payoff structures and
repetition. These two assumptions justify the presence of a mecha-
nism to cope with such uncertainty. A third characteristic inherent to
game theory, is the fact that our payoff is a function of other agent
actions, which make cooperation enforcement, an important study of
game theory. In this section we will present three games that encom-
pass these three notions (the prisoner dilemma, Bayesian games and
repeated games), for each of these games, we discuss the role trust
plays.
This also means that we concentrate on the so called strategic games,
in which players choose their actions simultaneously. This concept can
be formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A strategic game consists of:
• A set of players N = {1, 2, · · · , n},
• for each player i, a set of actions (or strategies) Ai and
• for each player i, a utility function ui : A → R, where A = A1 ×
A2 × · · · × An.
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Prisoner dilemma(PD): The prisoner’s dilemma is a canonical ex-
ample of an interaction framework, analyzed in game theory. Such
analysis shows why two purely rational individuals might not co-
operate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do
so.
Following the description given in [58], this game presents the fol-
lowing situation: Two members of a criminal gang (A and B) are
arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement
with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the
other. The prosecutors do not have enough evidence to convict
the pair on the principal charge. They hope to get both sentenced
to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecu-
tors offer each prisoner a Faustian bargain. Each prisoner is given
the opportunity either to: betray the other by testifying that the
other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by re-
maining silent. Here is the offer: If A and B each betray the other,
each of them serves 2 years in prison. If A betrays B but B remains
silent, A will be set free and B will serve 3 years in prison (and
vice versa). If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only
serve 1 year in prison (on the lesser charge).
Using the standard matrix notation for players payoffs, the follow-
ing matrix represents the game.
C D
C 1,1 3,0
D 3,0 2,2
Speaking generally, one might say that an instance of PD is a
game in which a cooperative outcome is only obtainable when every
player violates rational self-interest. There is no accepted pure
solution 3.
3In game theory, accepted solutions are solutions that satisfy a conceptual notion
of rational strategy, in this case, strategies that are a Nash equilibrium
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Baysian games In many applicative scenarios of game theory, differ-
ent players have an asymmetric access to information about some
important aspects of the game, including a special case in which
some players know more than others and may use this informa-
tion to get better payoffs. Bayesian games are used to study such
situation.
Informally, the central notion of Bayesian games is the notion of
player types. It is used to describe a player knoweldge about the
other participant of the game. Each player is aware of his own
type, but is uncertain about the other players type. The type
of a player, will specify his utility function, and the probability
distribution that defines his knowledge about the other player’s
type. The goal of every player is to maximize his payoff for any of
the other player’s types. A player will then need to form a belief
about the other player’s strategies, given his knowledge of the type
distribution before making any decision. Of course, all beliefs must
be consistent.
Definition 2 A Bayesian game consists of a set of players N =
{1, 2, · · · , n}, where to each player i, we associate:
• a set of possible actions Ai
• a set of possible types Ti
• a probability function pi : Ti → ∆(T−i), where T−i = ×j∈N\{i}Tj
and ∆(T−i) is the space of probability distributions upon T−i.
• a utility function ui : A × T → R, where A = ×i∈NAi and
T = ×i∈NTi
The main concept of rational solution to Bayesian games is based
on the notion of Bayesian equilibrium.
Definition 3 Any strategy profile σ∗ ∈ ×i∈N ×ti∈Ti ∆(Ai) is a
Bayesian equilibrium if for any type ti of any player i mixed strat-
egy σ?(ai | ti) maximizes player i’s expected payoff. Where the
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expectation is taken over all combinations of types of the other
players.
According to Bayesian decision theory, a rational player should
choose a Bayesian equilibrium.
Repeated games To model repeated interactions, game theorists use
the concept of repeated games in which the same so-called stage
game is repeated a finite or infinite number of times.
To define a repeated game and its equilibrium we need to de-
fine the player’s strategy sets and payoffs for the entire repeated
game, given the strategies and payoffs of its constituent stage
game. Therefore, we assume that the stage game is an n-player
strategic game and that the action set of each player i, Ai, is fi-
nite. The stage game payoffs are defined in the usual way, as maps
ui : A → R, where A = ×i∈NAi. With Ai, the space of all strate-
gies of player i. Assuming that the players observe each other’s
realized pure strategies at the end of each stage and are aware of
them when choosing the next stage strategies we can proceed as
follows: let at = 〈at1, · · · , atn〉 be the pure strategy profile relized in
period t and ht = 〈a0, · · · , at−1〉 the history of these profiles for all
periods before t. Finally, H t denotes the set of all such period-t
histories.
Then a period-t strategy of player i in the repeated game is any
mapping σti : H t → Ai. A player strategy i for the whole repeated
game is then a sequence of such maps σi = {σti}∞t=1.
At all stages of the game players receive some payoffs. Meaning
that comparing possible payoff, sums to comparing series. There
are three criteria adopted in the literature to do so: time-average,
overtaking and discounting criterion. Each one of this criteria
correspond to a different view of past, present and future outcomes
value.
Concerning the prisoner dilemma, this game can be applied in many
applicative context(some of them not involving a prison sentence), like
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online e-commerce. In such systems, the traditional way to solve this
issue (by assuming mixed strategy games) is not viable (no one is
actually seeing as a good solution that a seller flip a coin to know if he
should send or not a good, or the buyer to send the money). Trust is
then a way to implement common belief of cooperation.
Repeated games emphasize the ties that good behavior may have
upon interaction, intuitively, because the players can condition their
future play on the past plays of their opponents and can stop to co-
operate if the opponents do not play in a specific way. The quality of
interaction affects players trust, which in return affects the trustee pay-
off. This emphasizes a kind of rationality built over time and through
interaction. One should also stress that such type of interactions are
also very risky, because someone can take advantage of such system
(think e.g. eBay frauds), which underlines the necessity to carefully
craft a trust system.
Finally, Bayesian games show that uncertainty is difficult to tackle,
deciding what to do under such framework is often based on the ex-
pected utility principle presented in Section 1.2.1.
We remark that the relation between trust and game theory, can
be seen from two perspectives. (1) If studying trust effects of such
games is pursued from the point of view of the game designer, who
would play the of an external agent that take in account, the game
description as a whole, then we trust can be associated to some nor-
mative notion. It can take the aspect of a reputation mechanism in
some cases. (2) Working with individual trust amounts to defining a
localized mechanism, where agents have access to limited information
(for example, only the interactions that were conducted by them in re-
peated games), or they may have access to all information, but adopt
a trust modelization that is subjective and based on principles that are
proper to them (for example a proper type probability distribution in
a Bayesian network).
Game theory is a very successful framework to deal with decision
making within uncertainty. Nevertheless it was remarked (i.e., in [1]),
that the assumption of such framework, are applicable to system de-
sign, where the different utility function of agents are available to the
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system designer, such assumptions makes game theory, a very difficult
framework to implement trust based solution, to help interaction in
open systems.
1.2.3 MAS
A multi-agent system (MAS) is a computerized system composed of
multiple interacting intelligent agents within an environment. Multi-
agent systems can be used to solve problems that are difficult or im-
possible for an individual agent or a monolithic system to solve.
MAS can be used to model different types of interaction, which
usually correspond to systems with different types of agents. Such large
definition makes multi-agent formalization a field that encompasses a
large set of visions of what is cooperation, with both abundance of
paradigms upon which a formalization can be constructed, and theories
of implementation that instantiate those paradigms.
An important class of MAS, is that of open multi-agent systems. In
comparison with other MAS paradigms in open MAS, agents can freely
join and leave at any time and where the agents may hold different aims
and objectives that are not necessary compatible with other agents of
the systems. Agents can also assume different identities in the system,
even at the same time. These features are sources of the following trust
related issues in MAS:
1. In most case, the agents are likely to be self-interested and may
be unreliable, such property comes from the fact that such agents,
may be representative of concurrent parties (i.e. competitive com-
panies), that needs to cooperate, in order to achieve respectively
their personal goals.
2. No agent can know everything about its environment, either due
to the unavailability of the information or due to its cost (either in
terms of time or in terms of computational or monetary resources),
it is also difficult to assume instant monitoring capabilities, due to
the high dynamical nature of the system.
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3. As a result of the impossibility to track the definitive identity
of the agents, it is difficult (or even impossible) to implement a
system where a central authority can control all the agents, either
by imposing normative restriction on interactions, or mechanisms
to sanction bad behavior.
In relevant scenarios, despite the uncertain nature of the interaction
system, agents cannot afford not to interact, due to the fact that their
goals are unachievable without external help. To decide his course of
action, an agent would need to cope with incomplete knowledge about
his environment and other agents. As we have seen, trust plays a
central role in facilitating these tasks.
In our case, we will illustrate the different formalisms that were used
to describe multi-agent systems, and were used to study trust, while
emphasizing representation of epistemic agents. We will focus on MAS
that are based on logical frameworks.
BDI frameworks What we call the belief, desire, intension (BDI )
models are descriptions of the agents’ cognitive states, constructed
upon claims originally proposed by Bratman [13] on the role of in-
tentions in practical reasoning. Specifically, Bratman argued that
rational agents will tend to focus their practical reasoning on the
intentions they have already adopted, and will tend to bypass full
consideration of options that conflict with those intentions.
Bratman’s view of agency was implemented in different frame-
works. The one of interest here, is Cohen and Levesque’s logic,
which is the best example of the use of modal logic to represent
BDI models. We choose to concentrate on modal logic representa-
tion, since it was the framework that we chose to implement the
trust model that we present in the next chapter, for more details
on such type of logics we recommend [59].
Cohen and Levesque’s logic accounts for BDI models, by using
basic modal notion of beliefs (using a KD45 operator), the notion
of desire is associated to the notion of preferences and goals, while
the notion of intention is defined, using different modal operators
of the logic:
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• dynamic operator as defined in Linear Propositional Dynamic
logics (PDL),
• belief operators, and
• preference operators.
The semantics of such logic is based on the notion of frame, as a
quadruple M = 〈W,R,B, P 〉, where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• R : (I × A) → (W ×W ) maps an authored action pi, to an
accessibility relations Rpi;
• B : I → (W ×W ) maps agents i to accessibility relations Bi,
used to represent agents beliefs;
• P : I → (W ×W ) maps agents i to accessibility relations Pi,
used to represent the agent’s preferred worlds.
Such frames satisfy the following constrains:
• 〈W,Ri〉 is a linear transition system;
• every Bi is serial, transitive and euclidean, which are the stan-
dard constrains to define a KD45 belief operator;
• Pi ⊆ Bi, for every i ∈ I, which makes the preference of agents,
rational, or compatible with their beliefs.
The notion of intention is defined as follows:
1. i has the achievement goal if i prefers that ϕ is eventually true
and believes that ϕ is currently false. Formally:
AGoaliϕ ≡ PrefiFϕ ∧ Beli¬ϕ
2. i has the persistent goal that ϕ if i has the achievement goal
that ϕ and will keep that goal until it is either fulfilled or
believed to be out of reach. Formally:
PGoaliϕ ≡ AGoaliϕ ∧ (AGoaliϕ) ∪ (Beliϕ ∨ BeliG¬ϕ)
Intendiϕ ≡ PGoaliϕ ∧ BeliF∃αHappi:αϕ
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Cohen and Levesque succeeded in providing a fine-grained analysis
of intention by relating that concept to action, belief and realistic
preference. Such definition describes a mental state of an agent
that acts, in accordance with his belief and intentions. Under such
setting, trust can be characterized as a special case of belief (as
we will see in section 1.3.3). From a normative perspective, trust
can be defined as a condition of the context of interaction, whose
presence compensates partially the uncertainty of the outcome of
interaction.
Dynamic epistemic logic Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) can be
seen as the study of how to reason about model change. The
main interest of the field, is to characterize how agents can share
knowledge, update it and revise it.
Dynamic epistemic logic is often defined by describing three ele-
ments: the epistemic part of the logic, or how agents represent
their epistemic state, A dynamic part , describes external inter-
action of agents, those interactions can change both the current
state of the system, and the agents knowledge. This changes can
be either noticed or not by the agents, such interaction can be
dynamic operators, or announcement operator. Finally, the belief
change and update element describes how the dynamic part and
the epistemic part interact. Some representative of
• Public announcement logic [73]
• Epistemic PDL [74]
• BMS logic [7]
ABC that we present in the next chapter, is also a dynamic epis-
temic logic, which uses authored assignment to model interaction
in a multi agent system.
Multi-agent systems that can be described in dynamic epistemic
logic, can take advantage of a trust model in different ways. Trust
can be a conditional element of the framework (implemented as
a formula of the logic modeling what an agent knows), to decide
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if the disclosure of some information would be judicious or not.
Trust can be used to implement a delegation system, where one
may delegate action to more efficient agents. Finally, trust can be
used within the process of belief change and update, when faced
with incoherent information from different sources, to define ag-
gregation processes.
Agent-based negotiation language Sierra & al. presented in [67] a
multi agent framework to study trust in agent negotiation. While
the trust model was probabilistic (as an implementation of entropy
estimation in information theory), the presented MAS, or at least
the communication language of the agents was based on a logical
framework.
When an agent α is negotiating with an opponent β, they aim to
strike a deal δ = 〈a, b〉 where a is α’s commitment and b is β’s.
A denotes the set of all possible commitments by α, and B the
set of all possible commitments by β. The agents have two lan-
guages, C for communication and L for internal representation of
interaction.
L is thus a dynamic language constructed upon the following atomic
actions:
Atm = {Offer,Accept,Reject,Withdraw, Inform}
with the following syntax and informal meaning:
• Offer(α, β, δ): agent α offers agent β a deal δ = 〈a, b〉 with
action commitments a for α and b for β.
• Accept(α, β, δ): agent α accepts agent β’s previously offered
deal δ.
• Reject(α, β, δ, [info]): agent α rejects agent
β’s previously offered deal δ. Optionally, information explain-
ing the reason for the rejection can be given.
• Withdraw(α, β, δ, [info]): agent α breaks down negotiation with
β. Extra info justifying the withdrawal may be given here.
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• Inform(α, β, [info]) agent α informs β about info.
Where [info] can be either of a (i) dymanic nature (related to an
agent process used to solve a problem), or (ii) beliefs of the agent
including preferences.
Using these atomic actions that can be performed between agents,
a dialog can be constructed in order to trigger reaction from other
agents. The existence of a shared protocol between agents, to
ensure the coherence of communication need to be assumed (e.g.
an offer cannot be accepted if it was not made).
On the other hand, the content language expressed by an agent
(of which [info] is a part) is a dynamic epistemic language that
allows to represent agents beliefs, knowledge, and different types
of preferences and conditionals.
Some simple examples of what can be represented in this language
are the following:
• "I prefer red wine to white wine when served meat." as:
Inform(α, β, if Food = meat then Wine = red >Wine = white)
• "I prefer more money to less money" as:
Inform(α, β, soft(tanh, {Money}))
where tanh is an ordering function, and soft expresses a pref-
erence constrain.
• "I reject your offer since I definitely cannot pay more than 200
euros" as:
Reject(α, β,Money = 250, hard(Money < 200ee, {Money}))
where hard express a practical, or a "deal breaker" constrain.
• and "I prefer red cars to yellow cars" as:
Inform(α, β, if thing = car then Colour = Red > Colour = Yellow)
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An agent’s set of beliefs, is constructed using a sequence of such
formulas. Using this knowledge base, the agent can enter in a
negotiation phase, guided by his beliefs (perceived as a probability
distribution) estimated using the information theory concept of
entropy.
The main issue with such an interaction protocol, comes from the
uncertainty related to the current situation, where, the more "fo-
cused" an agent is (with less probability dispersion over the pos-
sible context states), the more efficient his actions will be. Trust
in such situation is associated to a measure of the dispersion of an
agent’s belief probability.
Trust plays a crucial part in any multi-agent system that models
complex agents, interacting within an uncertain and risky context.
The relevance of MAS is related to the set of applications that can be
implemented in this formalism which ranges over a wide variety of net-
worked computer systems such as Grid computing [25], the Semantic
Web [36], ubiquitous computing systems [45], peer-to-peer systems [65],
etc.
1.3 Trust models
The previous section presented a set of application fields that did put
some light on how trust can be integrated in interaction systems, and
how a trust model should tackle in order to be significant. The outcome
was the view that trust is either:
• a normative notion, that can be observed, or desired in a cooper-
ative system,
• a process, that is part of a communication protocol, whose goal is
to help interacting in uncertain and risky situations,
• or a piece of information that is either acquired, or given, and
represents an abstraction of the current state of the system, that
is significant for the agent’s future tasks.
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In this section we present a set of trust models, that will be of these
different types. We order them by their theories of implementation,
which are:
Social network approaches: that uses an ad hoc aggregation func-
tion, to predict the behavior of probabilistic agents. Such aggrega-
tion function can not generally be described using a probabilistic
semantic.
Probabilistic approaches: the success of probability theory in rep-
resenting uncertainty makes it a straightforward choice, to imple-
ment trust models, statistical inference methods are often used to
calculate trust, often as the probability of future successful inter-
actions.
Logical approaches: logical models of trust are of two kind, epis-
temic models that represent trust as a cognitive notion linked to
the belief state of a given agent, or a protocol model, that given
the description of a communication system (for example, a sensor
network) would infer a statement on interaction to be trustworthy
or not.
1.3.1 Social network
Social networks models of trust, target probabilistic peer behavior and
are mainly characterized by ad hoc feedback aggregation strategies.
Normally they imply the aggregation of all trust and reputation infor-
mation available in the system.
Beth, Borcherding, and Klein [8] presented one of the early ex-
amples of a social trust model that takes in account, both personal
interaction and recommendations. In their model, an agent can ei-
ther enter in direct interaction (d), or recommend an agent(r). A
recommended agent can either give his opinion about direct in-
teraction with the trustee(d), or recommend an other agent (r),
etc. Thus, a feedback in this model is a binary valuation of an
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interaction or a recommendation W = {r, d} × {0, 1}, for exam-
ple 〈d, 1〉 correspond to a successful direct interaction, while 〈r, 0〉
correspond to a failed recommendation or a recommendation that
lead to a bad interaction.
The feedback aggregation algorithm starts by aggregating all direct
and indirect interactions with direct acquaintances in the network
to form direct trust valuation using the formula vijd (p) = 1 − αp,
where i is the truster agent, j is the trustee, p is direct positive
experience (the amount of 〈d, 1〉 associated to j) and α being a
parameter such that 0 < α < 1. In this step, if i has experienced
at least one bad interaction with j, he should put vijd (p) = 0. The
second step is to evaluate recommendation using vijd . If i is the
truster and j is a recommender, p is the positive and n the number
of negative interactions with j, the recommender, recommendation
trust is defined as vijr (p, n) = 1 − αp−n if p > n and 0 otherwise.
The exact value of parameter α is left to the discretion of the
truster.
By means of such computation we can actually order agents of the
virtual community in a graph, where the agents ar the nodes of
the graph. Between two nodes of this graph there are at most two
edges, one representing direct interaction between the source node
and the target node, and the second, corresponding to the eval-
uation of the source node recommendations. A peer that would
evaluate trust with another of the network, would take in account,
all paths, that goes from him (the truster) to the evaluated node
(the trustee) such that we choose paths that are constructed exclu-
sively with recommendation edges, except for the last edge which
would represent a direct interaction. Such mechanisms propagate
trust along the graph. Given a truster i0 and a trustee ik and a
trust path i 〈vi0i1r , vi1i2r , · · · , vik−2ik−1r , vik−1ikd 〉, the quantification of
trust expressed by the path is calculated using the function:
vpath i = 1− (1− vik−1ikd )v
i0ik−1
r
with vi0ik−1r =
∏k−1
n=1 v
in−1in
r .
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Trust path values are then aggregated in group path, where a group
is defined by paths that share the same penultimate node. Given
a group of m paths 〈path1, · · · , pathm〉, the aggregation function
is as follows:
vgroup〈path1,··· ,pathm〉 = m
√√√√√ m∏
j=1
(1− vpath j)
Finally, groups trusts are aggregated to form the trust value. which
for m groups, corresponds to v = 1− ∏mi=1 vgroup i.
From a complexity point of view, this algorithm would perform
poorly, w.r.t. the context of application it was proposed for (peer
to peer networks) due to the number of peers that can reach thou-
sands of nodes. Such complexity can be lowered, by involving the
other peers by propagating the calculation in the network, or in-
troducing heuristics to select paths taken in account. For example
Yu and Singh [77] presented a polynomial time feedback aggrega-
tion, that sees recommendation and direct interaction as the same
notion. While the aggregation processes of this approach is actu-
ally similar to Beth’s approach, the main difference is that Yu and
Singh only aggregate paths that carry maximal values form the
source to all the neighbors of the destination node.
Richardson, Agrawal, and Domingos [60] presented an efficient
algorithm to calculate trust, by merging a trust multi-graph over
a network of agents. A trust multi-graph is simply a graph, where
nodes are agents, and labeled edges represent the value of trust
that an agent has toward another (where, a trust value is a real
number). The aggregation approach considers the matrix M ≡
[Mij]Ni,j=1, where N is the number of agents of the system. it is
supposed that M has been normalized such that for every 1 ≤
i, j ≤ N :
0 ≤Mij ≤ 1 and
N∑
k=1
= 1
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The elements of the obtained matrix will be used to change its own
values, for example, since the value Mij represents the direct trust
estimation of i about j, the lineMiX of the matrix, corresponds to
the opinion of the agent i about the whole network, while the col-
umn MXj corresponds to the opinion of network about j; knowing
this, an opinion Mij, altered by the opinion of the network on i
(MXi) which itself is altered by changes in Mij, this means that
an aggregation algorithm would iterate the matrix (by aggregating
and concatenating trust values), until the Matrix converges.
Richardson, Agrawal, and Domingos matrix based aggregation,
can be seen as a generalization of different aggregation algorithms
that can be found in the literature. Such algorithms include PageR-
ank, which is the algorithm used by Google to order web pages [54].
Xiong and Liu [76] presented a calculation method that does not
require the aggregation of trust valuations within all the agents of
the system, but propagates trust directly among the agents. In this
work, agents express direct valuations as a rating from the interval
[0, 1]. The main idea of the algorithm is to compute trust as an
average of all the direct feedback that the network can provide
about the trustee, while weighting those feedbacks by the trust
value of the agents, given those feedbacks. Calculating trust tj
toward the trustee j, is calculated as follow:
tj =
∑
e∈ incoming(j)
we
tsource(e)∑
f∈ incoming(j) tsource(e)
where incoming(j) is the set of all direct feedback about the agent
j, we is the feedback of the agent e and tsource(e) is the calculated
trust value of the agent e.
The computation of trust is still a time consuming process, due to
the iterative task of retrieving feedbacks and recursively calculat-
ing trust toward agents of the whole network.
To sum it up, social network approaches to trust (and reputation)
valuation, offer a way to provide a decision system, with numerical
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parameters to guide interaction, nevertheless, the semantics of these
numerical values is difficult to understand, for both defining a threshold
of interaction and for comparing trust estimates for different agents.
Even if in some contexts, it can be associated to a probability mea-
sure, in complex systems, where the semantics of the trust valuation
is crucial, it is generally considered that such approaches are not rec-
ommended, except with a lot of empirical testing [21].
1.3.2 Probabilistic modelization of trust
Probability theory, is the most widely adopted approach, to model
trust, this can be associated to the historical place that probability
theory take towards representing systems with uncertainty and risk.
Over time, probability theory matured to embody a set of theo-
ries and practices that use it in decision framework. When we talk
about a probabilistic approach, we often refers to three different set of
tools [61]:
• Statistical inference: statistical inference is the process of mod-
eling and estimating a probability function related to a random
process (a stochastic system),the modelization process is based on
defining the form of the function that would be used to represent
the system, while the inference reside on the estimation of such
function, together with a quantification of the quality of such es-
timation (if supported by our decision process).
• Probability theory: probability theory it the mathematical field
that group the tools that are used to study probability as a mathe-
matical objects, their relations and properties, the main objects of
probability theory are the concepts of random variables, stochastic
processes and events. to be noted that probability theory generally
deals with abstract (perfect) probability functions, different from
estimations, as contrast with what statistical inference produces.
• Decision theory: the decision process is the theory that adds an
applicative decisional vision upon probability theory. Defining a
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decision problem sharpen the tools that will be used in statistical
inference while estimating the probability function of the studied
system, and the assumption that one will use within the realm of
probability theory.
Since we associate decision theory to the field of application of trust
in this survey. Defining a trust model in our view, amounts to identi-
fying a probability model representing the system, a et of properties of
the system as a valuation of trust (i.e., the probability of good inter-
action, or the average of quality of interaction that can be predicted,
etc.), together with the statistical inference process, that, in most cases,
will provide a way to estimate the probability of the system, using the
history of past interactions.
Despotovic and Aberer [20] present a rather simple trust model
to manage trust in peer-to-peer networks. Their model identifies
trust i, to the subjective probability of the truster to have a suc-
cessful interaction with the trustee j (denoted θj) during the next
interaction. Such probability is derived form a history of binary
evaluation of the quality of past interactions. A history of inter-
action is a tuple 〈x1, x2, , · · · , xn〉 where (xi ∈ {0, 1}) which was
reported respectively by the peers 〈p1, p2, · · · , pn〉. Given that a
peer pk may lie about his reported valuation xk about the trustee
j, with a probability lk, the authors propose the following function
as the probability of reporting:
P [xi = e] =
lk(1− θj) + (1− lk)θj if e = 1lkθj + (1− lk)(1− θj) if e = 0
This is then used to calculate the likelihood of observing the history
〈p1, p2, · · · , pn〉, as a function of θi, to be
L(θj) = P [x1]P [x2] · · ·P [xn]
Estimating the trust of i toward j, amounts then to estimate the
probability θi. This is done by using the maximum likelihood prin-
ciple, that stipulates that θj should be the value that maximizes
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the probability to observe the current history, or the value that
maximizes L(θ).
Hang & al. [31] present an approach that is similar to the social net-
work model presented by Beth, Borcherding, and Klein [8]. They
study how a client would estimate the trustworthiness of a service
provider (or his reputation) based on a history of direct interac-
tion provided by agents called witnesses, where the role of indirect
interaction is be played by agents referred too as recommenders.
The main difference between Hang & al.’s and Beth & al.’s mod-
els, is that Hang & al.’s model makes the distinction between
trust, as constructed from direct interaction (or evidence), from the
trustworthiness of the agent that was reported by recommender.
These two quantifications are modeled by the mean of two different
spaces.
Direct trust is associated to the probability of an expected positive
outcome α = rr+s , where r are past direct positive interactions, and
s are the failed ones. On the other hand, indirect trust is modeled
using a triple 〈b, d, u〉, where b + d + u = 1 that can be inter-
preted as weights of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty, respectively,
of the probability of good interaction. We present here the update
function that the authors provide for direct trust.
The authors propose an ad hoc method to update their direct trust
〈r, s〉 w.r.t. new information provided by referrers in the network,
by providing their trust 〈r′, s′〉. Such update is done in two steps:
• Estimating the accuracy of the recommendation, by comparing
it to the truster’s own estimation. This is done by calculating
the ratio between the two trust values α = rr+s and α
′ = r′r′+s′
q = α(1− α)
α′(1− α′)
• Updating the trust value α, by concatenating 〈r, s〉 and 〈r′q, s′(1−
q)〉 into a vector 〈r + r′q, s+ s′(1− q)〉.
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The authors also provide different update function, for example
to account for trust deprecation overtime, that resemble Marsh’s
view of trust (as presented in section 1.1.2.)
Chatalic & al. [53] present a parametric trust model, meant to deal
with conflict within a peer-to-peer inference system. The goal of
trust in this system is to provide a way to deal with inconsistency
in query answering in description logic.
In summary, the authors defines trust as the probability that the
trustee has, to answer a query (associating database elements, to
a query description) in a correct way. The evaluation is then a
binary number (1 for success and 0 for fail). This probability
function follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter θ, defined
upon the evaluation of the next interaction, as a random variable
X:
P (X = k) =
 θ if k = 11− θ if k = 0
Estimating (or updating) this probability function, amounts to
estimate the value of the parameter θ. To do so, the authors,
follow a Bayesian approach to statistical inference, which perceive
θ itself as a random variable that follows a probability distribution
(in this case, a normal distribution). The chosen value of θ will be
its expected value E(θ).
Josan & al. [41] present a model that can be seen as a generalization
of the precedent trust model, to graded evaluation ( and not only
binary evaluations). The approach uses a Dirichlet distribution
function to implement for example, a system of evaluation that
takes its value from the set {mediocre, bad, average, good, excellent}.
This means that, given a finite valuation space X = 1, 2, · · · , k,
trust is characterized by the probability distribution over valua-
tions of X. The only constraint on this probability is the standard
additivity property ∑i∈{1,2,··· ,k} P (X = i) = 1. This probability is
described by a probability vector ~p = {P (X = i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
44
In this model, the history of interaction corresponds to a k-vector
~α = {αi | 1 ≤ i ≤ l}. where each αi can be one of our k valuation.
The Dirichlet model that is proposed, is a direct generalization of
the binomial modelization of trust
f(~p | ~α) = Γ(
∑k
i=1 αi)∏k
i=1 Γ(αi)
∏k
i=1 p(X = i)(αi−1)
where

P (X = 1), · · · , P (x = k)∑k
i=1 P (x = i) = 1
α1, · · · , αk
As seen in the last trust model, each evaluation is associated to
a probability distribution toward its estimation, that would rep-
resent the expectation that the evaluation will be picked for the
future interaction. This expectation in the case of a Dirichlet dis-
tribution, corresponds to:
E(pi | ~α) = αi∑k
i=1 αi
The main property of a probabilistic approach to model trust is
its ability to quickly converge to a good estimation of the probability
model representing the system.
While the success of probability approaches comes form the accep-
tance that social interaction can be simulated by stochastic systems,
such approaches do not take into account the recursive nature of trust,
or the ability of the trustee to manipulate the behavior of the truster,
in order to misbehave. Logical models, in their epistemic form, try to
deal with such issues by studying a more complex models of agents.
1.3.3 Logical modelization of trust
Logical approaches to model trust falls under two main categories, de-
pending on what they are actually trying to model. The epistemic
approach to trust modeling tries to study the inner state of the sys-
tem’s agents, which comprise how they perceive other agents, how they
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update such knowledge and finally, how they use it to decide how they
will interact. In such approaches, trust is a cognitive concept, pre-
sented as the counter part of the agent actions. On the other hand,
protocol based approach to trust modeling, is interested in representing
the communication protocol of the interaction system as a whole. In
such approaches, trust is associated to a set of rules that an agent fol-
lows to decide how to interact; in such approaches, trust is associated
to the performances of the different agents and their ability to conduct
successful interactions, without any regard to their intention behind
their behavior. Some representative of this two approaches are:
Herzig & al. [33] present a logical formalization of Castelfranchi &
Falcone model of trust, using a BDI framework (see section 1.2 for
more details).
We remark that we will only present the formalization of occurrent
trust of this (or trust w.r.t. a defined future delegation), since this
was the trust that we presented in section 1.1
We recall that according to C&F, trust is a predicate Trust(i, j, α, ϕ),
that describes the trust that an agent i (the truster) has in an agent
j (the trustee), in achieving one of i’s goals ϕ, by executing the
action α. Such trust is the case if:
• i has the goal ϕ;
• i believes that j is capable to do α;
• i believes that j has the power to achieve ϕ by doing α; and
• i believes that j intends to do α.
According to Herzig & al., the notion of belief is associated to the
modal system KD45,
Believes(i, ϕ) ≡ Beliϕ
On the other hand, goals are perceived as preferences about the fu-
ture. Its instantiation uses the standard temporal operator Eventuallyϕ
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(whose semantics is based on transition relations between possi-
ble states as seen in [71]). The notion of preferences is Cohen
and Levesque’s binary preferences Prefiϕ, which we present in sec-
tion 1.2.
Goal(i, ϕ) ≡ Prefi F ϕ
The remaining of the predicate involved in C&F definition are
defined as follows:
• j is capable to do α corresponds the fact that all execution of
α by j succeeds:
¬Afterj:α⊥
• j has the power to do α, corresponds to the fact that there is
an execution of α by j that makes ϕ true
Afterj:αϕ
• finally, j intends to do α corresponds to the fact that j prefers
to execute α
PrefjDoesj:α
Such formalization allows to model trust in a cognitive agent tak-
ing in account the context of execution, the abilities of the agent
and his intention in the realization of a given goal. Such complex
division allows us to associate to trust (or distrust), conditions re-
lated to the environment, the competence of the trustee, and his
willingness to cooperate. We remark that the trust model that
we present in chapter 2, is an extension of this model, to action
compositions [12].
Standers & al. [69] present a formalization of trust that is based
on the argumentation framework that was proposed by Prade &
Amgoud in [3]. The goal of the authors is to construct a trust
model that associates to a trust valuation of a given situation, a
set of arguments that justify such valuation.
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In order to do so, the trust agent first constructs a knowledge base
about the other agents in the system. A knowledge base corre-
sponds to a set of tuple ki, γi, where ki ∈ L is a fuzzy formula
and γi ∈ [0, 1] is a confidence that the agent has in ki. The val-
uation of a fuzzy formulas ki in a world state w is given using a
valuation function vw : L ↔: [0, 1]. The value vw(ki) quantify the
applicability of the fuzzy formulas ki in the world w.
The knowledge base regenerately contains fuzzy rules, i.e. a mate-
rial implication from an observation (condition) to an expected/learned
effect (conclusion). Such a rule can be partially applicable in a par-
ticular world state, instead of just being fully applicable or not at
all. such rules are used to describe situations where trust is then
a propositional formula that, given the description of the current
situation (as a world state), would be reached or not using these
rules.
In this framework, when a truster is given the choice to trust or
not the trustee, this decision is reached using the following argu-
mentation framework:
Definition 4 Given a truster 〈K,G, T 〉 where K is a knowledge
base, G is a formulas describing his goals and T = {t,¬t} is a set
of available option (to trust or not trust the trustee), an argument
A in favor of a decision α ∈ T is a triple A = 〈S,C, α〉, where
• S ⊆ K is the support of the argument, containing the knowl-
edge from the agent’s knowledge base K used to predict the
consequences of decision α,
• C ⊆ G are the consequences of the argument, i.e. the goals
reached by the decision α, and
• α is the conclusion argument A recommends.
Moreover, S∪d entails C, S is minimal, and C is maximal among
the sets satisfying the above conditions.
Given the set of all possible argument that can be generated by
a truster’s knoweldge base K and Goals G to decide to trust or
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not a trustee T = {t,¬t}, a decision is made by choosing the
argument(s) with the higher strength. Given an argument A, such
value is calculated using using the level of confidence the truster
has in the support of the argument, and the weight or desirability
of the outcome.
Jøsan [42] presents a model of trust based on subjective logic [40].
Subjective logic is presented as a belief calculus that takes into
account that perceptions about the world always are subjective in
nature, i.e. such view results form a limit set of observation, that
can be used to estimate the probability of the view’s validity. This
translates into using a belief model that can express degrees of un-
certainty about probability estimates. While statistical inference
principles are used to estimate the validity of atomic propositions,
a logical framework governs the way this proposition are combined
to construct the formulas of the language.
Subjective logic is based on the notion of opinion. Where an opin-
ion wAx is the opinion owned by A, x is the proposition to which
the opinion applies. A is often omitted if we are working with the
opinion of a single agent. For example, a binomial opinion (or an
opinion that applies to a single proposition, and can be represented
as a beta distribution) can be represented by a tuple wx = 〈b, d, u〉
such that b, d, u, a ∈ [0, 1] where b + d + u = 1, b is the agent’s
certainty about x, d correspond to his certainty about ¬x, and u
codes his uncertainty about his opinion. special reasoning cases
depending on the values of b,d and u can give a sense of what does
these values corresponds to:
• b = 1 corresponds to the classical logical notion of trueness,
• d = 1 corresponds to the classical logical notion of falsity,
• b+ d = 1 corresponds to a traditional probability,
• b + d < 1 corresponds to a degree of uncertainty about the
opinion, and item b+ d = 0 corresponds to total uncertainty.
The following table show some operators, proposed to combine
opinions (to calculate opinions on more complex formulas):
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Name Operator
Addition wAx∨y = wAx + wAy
Multiplication wAx∧y = wAx × wAy
Complement wA¬x = ¬wAx
Deduction wAx‖y = wAx } (wAy‖x, wAy‖¬x)
Consensus wA♦Bx = wAx + wBx
Where for example, the deduction operator } is a direct appli-
cation of Bayes theorem. An interpretation of such operators (an
others) can be seen in [40].
Trust toward a formula, corresponds to the opinion the truster
constructed about it, which can be calculated given his opinions
toward atomic propositions of the language.
Krukow & Nielsen [44] presented a trust (or reputation model) to
deal with risky interaction in electronic commerce, that may in-
volve the disclosure of private informations to untrusted parties.
The authors approach describes a formal declarative language to
express interaction policies, such language is based on a (pure-
past) variant of linear temporal logic (LTL). Such language can be
used by an agent to describe how he should interact with other
agents, depending on their behavior in the past and their current
state of knowledge (as described by a history of interaction).
A history of interaction correspond to a sequence of events, occur-
ring of events and possible histories. It follows a structure that
describes dependencies between events. This structure is called an
event structure:
Definition 5 An event structure is a triple ES = 〈E,≤,#)〉 con-
sisting of a set E, and two binary relations on E: ≤ and #.
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The elements e ∈ E are called events, and the relation #, called
the conflict relation, is symmetric and irreflexive. The relation
≤ is called the (causal) dependency relation, and partially orders
E. The dependency relation satisfies the following axiom, for any
e ∈ E:
the set [e] = {e′ ∈ E | e′ ≤ e}is finite.
The conflict and dependency relations satisfy the following transi-
tivity axiom for any e, e′, e′′ ∈ E
(e#e′ and e′ ≤ e′′) implies e#e′′
Two events are independent if they are not in either of the two
relations.
With an event structure, past events can be used to ensure that
conflicting events will not occur in the future. This is why the
logic of policies presented by the authors is parametric in an event
structure.
Given an event structure ES, The syntax of their language (de-
noted L(ES)) is as follows:
ψ := e | ♦e | ψ0 ∧ ψ1 | ¬ψ | X−1ψ | ψ0Sψ1 | >
Where e is an atomic formulas that can be read as "e is an event
that was observed in the current working session", while ♦e, corre-
spond to "e can still occur within the current session", or e is possi-
ble. The operator X−1 (last time) and S (since) are the usual past-
time operators. other standard temporal operators can be defined
as abbreviations, for example F−1(ψ) ≡ > S ψ denotes the fact
that ψ is true at some time in the past, while G−1(ψ) = ¬F−1(¬ψ)
means that ψ is true at all times in the past.
Using formulas from this language (interpreted in linear models of
LTL), the authors are able to express different policies of inter-
actions. Some examples of such policies would be of a buyer (in
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eBay for example) who can decide to bid on an electronic auction
only if the auction is run by a seller that has never failed to send
goods for won auctions:
ψbids ≡ ¬F (time-out)
Furthermore, the buyer might require that the seller has never
provided negative feedback in auctions where payment was made:
ψbids ≡ ¬F (time-out) ∧G−1(negative→ ignore)
In this model, trust correspond to the set of policies that an agent
would define, in order to describe his way of interacting with other
agents, the more restrictive those policies are, the less the agent
trusts the others.
Czenko & al. [18] present a logic based trust management system,
as a security infrastructure (Called TuLiP)to secure content shar-
ing in peer-to-pper networks. As in the previous work, this trust
management infrastructure allows an agent of the network to spec-
ify a policy of interaction that will be enforced by the system.
Logical approaches to trust provide a way to represent more complex
aspects of trust, and how trust can be integrated in complex systems of
interaction. But such model suffer from logic formalization issues like
the complexity of reasoning with difficult logics, the difficulty to model
the situation and the necessity to manually tweak the formalization,
to resolve such issues.
1.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this survey, we tackled the issue of computational trust in a step
by step manner. We offered different points of reattachment to make
parallels between trust models, where two trust models can share the
same conceptual aspects, share the same application field or be im-
plemented within the same theory. We can use those parallels to talk
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about computational trust studies. The first element that comes out
of our study is the difficulty to study trust in an abstract setting.
Computational trust is often a middle element, that helps cognitive
agents associate observation and knowledge about the other agents and
choose between different acts, Abstracting trust limits the vocabulary
that can be used to describe trust formalizations. In another hand,
choosing the framework in which trust will be modeled has a great im-
portance in the usability of the model, for example, probability models
have better performances and are more easy to implement than logical
applications, but are not applicable in all contexts. Finally, efficiency
of trust models is often based on an intricate knowledge of the context
of application, which lead to ad hoc optimization of the proposed trust
model.
While constructing this survey, we identified a list of issues that we
deem important to the advancement of the field. We believe that such
issues should be dealt with in priority:
How to interface trust with different application fields. Dissociating
trust model from an applicative context, even with the difficulty
that it implies, is a necessity both to study the properties of a trust
model in different context of application, and comparing different
models to choose which one is better. This question translates
into the interest of the community in defining testbeds to compare
trust models w.r.t. a common application field, representatives of
such testbeds are [70] [27]. Also, the attempt to define, universal
languages to talk about trust in an abstract aspect which where
attempted in [56] [57] [68]
Decision process using trust. Since trust can be seen as the cog-
nitive counterpart of cooperative interaction, understanding the
semantic of a trust model is an essential part to define a decision
process that translate trust values to a sound protocol of interac-
tion. Such understanding would help us understand the risk of a
given interaction, for example to define different threshold of in-
teraction, depending on the sensibility of the action to follow. Un-
derstanding the semantic of a trust model helps us compare trust
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toward different agents and choose for example between different
options between them. Such issues where underlined by [49].
Heterogeneity of trust in distributed open systems. Within an
open setting like online interaction or service oriented architecture
solutions, one can assume that each agent of the system has his
own vision toward what construct a trusted interaction, and his
proper model of trust. One should take in account this element
when developing an agent instantiated to work on such type of
systems. In addition to the use of a common vocabulary to talk
about trust(as seen in the fist item of this list), the system may re-
quire an agent to share information about a trust valuation, while
adding arguments on how such trust valuation was calculated [3],
or to share feedbacks upon which a trust value was calculated to
ensure its compatibility with other agents’ valuations [8].
Deal with malicious agents. One of the most spread misconception
is to associate trust to performance analyses of interactor. While
this distinction is of little importance in simple system, it can be
crucial when dealing with cognitive agents with a behavior based
on high level concepts of rationality. Failure in interaction can
be traced to three main aspects: the ability of the interactor, the
context of interaction and finally the intension of the interactor.
While the ability of the agent and the context of interaction is a
widely studied subject, especially when related to the notion of
quality of services QoS [66] [50], trust models should distinguish
intentional misbehavior from technical difficulties while interac-
tion. Distinguishing this two different aspects of failure is a key to
identify malicious agents that may uses confusion either to mask
their bad behavior behind the context, or more dangerously, use
our own trust model against us, by adopting deception strategies
as seen in [30] [26].
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Chapter 2
Trust in complex
actions
2.1 Motivation: trust in service composi-
tions
In this chapter, we present our first trust model. We argue for the
necessity of a general and formal theory of trust that can be adapted
to a specific agent for his context of interaction. We focus on logical
theories. As seen in the previous survey, such theories view trust as a
particular belief of the truster involving ability and willingness of the
trustee to perform some action for the truster. Most of such theories are
about trust in an action of an individual trustee only. They therefore
cannot account for complex interactions in multi-agent systems where
an agent may e.g. ask several trustees to collaborate by composing
their efforts, i.e., by composing their individual actions into complex
actions, that might also be called complex programs. The ability to take
into account such examples seems essential to trust based applications.
In this first model, we provide a general definition of trust in a com-
plex action performed by multiple agents. We choose a formal, logical
approach in terms of a simple, decidable logic of action, belief, and
choice. The actions of our logic are assignments by an agent i of a
propositional variable p to either true or false, respectively noted i:+p
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and i:−p [35, 5]. Within the logical language we follow Castelfranchi
and Falcone and define the concept of trust as a special kind of be-
lief. We then show how to infer trust for different kinds of complex
action operators. For example, we show that agent i’s trust that the
sequence of actions pi1; pi2 is going to take place cannot be reduced to
the conjunction of (1) i’s trust that pi1 is going to take place and (2)
i’s trust that pi2 is going to take place. Indeed, the effect of pi1 might
be a precondition of pi2. Instead, i’s trust in pi1; pi2 should reduce to
(1) i’s trust that pi1 is going to take place and (2) i’s belief that after
pi1, i is going to trust that pi2 is going to take place.
2.2 ABC: A logic of action, belief and choice
Our logic is a fairly standard multimodal logic of action, belief, and
choice that we call ABC.
There are two belief modalities: strong belief, alias certainty, and
weak belief, alias plausibility. We will argue that the former is ap-
propriate to capture the truster’s belief about the trustee’s ability to
cooperate, while the latter is appropriate to capture the truster’s be-
lief about the trustee’s willingness to cooperate (despite his capability
to defect). The logic of both certainty and plausibility is the normal
modal logic K45; moreover, certainty implies plausibility. Following
Cohen and Levesque [17], we suppose that choice is realistic: certainty
implies choice (while plausibility does not).
Taking inspiration from boolean games [2] and dynamic epistemic
logics [23], we consider that atomic actions are assignments of propo-
sitional variables to truth values, with a simple semantics in terms of
model updates. Complex actions—alias programs—are then built by
means of standard program constructions such as sequential compo-
sition. We consider two modalities for such complex actions, one for
executability, and one for actual execution. The former enables us to
capture C&F’s external component of trust, which is about the en-
vironment allowing the execution of the trustee’s action. The latter
enables us to capture their internal component of trust, which is about
the trustee’s willingness to perform an action. It is therefore related to
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the choice modality: an agent only executes an action if he has chosen
it, and the other way round, cf.[33].
Belief and choice obey no forgetting and no learning principles that
are familiar from dynamic epistemic logics and epistemic temporal log-
ics, cf. [23].
2.2.1 Language
Throughout the chapter, P = {p, q, . . . } is a countably infinite set
of propositional variables and I = {i, j, k, . . . } is a finite set of agent
names.
In the epistemic dimension of the language, we have modal oper-
ators of certitude Certi, plausibility Plausi, and choice Choicei, one
per agent i ∈ I. The formula Certiϕ reads “i strongly believes that
ϕ”, Plausiϕ reads “i weakly believes that ϕ”, and Choiceiϕ reads “i
chooses that ϕ”, or “i prefers that ϕ”.
The dynamic dimension of the language is based on assignments. +p
makes p true and −p makes p false. An authored assignment is of the
form either i:+p or i:−p, where i is an agent from I and p is a variable
from P. The intuition for the former is that i sets the variable p to
true; for the latter it is that i sets p to false. An atomic action is a
finite set of authored assignments. The biggest set of atomic actions is
∆ = {i:+p : p ∈ P, i ∈ I} ∪ {i:−p : p ∈ P, i ∈ I}
Note that ∆ could as well be defined as the set of subsets of I×{+,−}×
P.
Given an atomic action δ ⊆ ∆ and an agent i ∈ I, i’s part of δ is
δ|i = {i:+p : i:+p ∈ δ} ∪ {i:−p : i:−p ∈ δ}.
Let p ∈ P be a propositional variable. An atomic action δ ∈ ∆ is said
to be consistent in p iff there are no i, j ∈ I such that i:+p, j:−p ∈ δ.
Otherwise δ is inconsistent in p. δ is consistent if δ is consistent in
each of its variables p.
Beyond the modal operators Certi and Choicei, our language has
two dynamic modal operators 〈.〉 and 〈〈.〉〉. The first of these operators
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is from Propositional Dynamic Logic PDL [32]. Both operators have
complex actions as arguments. The set of formula 〈pi〉ϕ reads “the ac-
tion pi is executable and ϕ is true afterwards”. In contrast, 〈〈pi〉〉ϕ reads
“pi is executed and ϕ is true afterwards”. The latter implies the for-
mer: execution implies executability. It is also clear that the other way
round, executability should not imply execution. So we read 〈i:+p〉>
as “i is able to make p true” and 〈〈i:+p〉〉> as “i is making p true”. The
formula 〈〈i:+p, j:−q〉〉ϕ expresses that the agents i and j are going to as-
sign the value ‘true’ to the propositional variable p and ‘false’ to q, and
that afterwards ϕ will be true; and Certk〈〈i:+p, j:−q〉〉ϕ expresses that
agent k believes that this is going to happen. As the reader may have
noticed, we drop the set parentheses around the atomic assignments
in formulas such as 〈i:+p〉>, 〈〈i:+p〉〉> and 〈〈i:+p, j:−q〉〉ϕ.
Formally, the definition of the set of actions (programs) Prog and
the set of well-formed formulas of ABC logic is by mutual induction as
follows:
pi := δ | skip | fail | pi; pi | if ϕ then pi else pi
ϕ := p | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Plausiϕ | Certiϕ | Choiceiϕ | 〈pi〉ϕ | 〈〈pi〉〉ϕ
where p ranges over P, i over I and δ over ∆. The set of well-formed
formulas is denoted by LABC.
Here is an example of a complex action. Let L mean that the light is
on. Then the program if L then j:−L else j:+L describes j’s action
of toggling the light switch.
The formulas without the dynamic operators 〈.〉 and 〈〈.〉〉 is noted
LBC.
For a given formula ϕ, the set P(ϕ) ⊆ P is the set of propositional
variables occurring in ϕ, and I(ϕ) ⊆ I is the set of agent names occur-
ring in ϕ. The sets P(pi) and I(pi) are defined likewise for programs pi.
For example, P(〈〈i:+p〉〉q) = {p, q} and I(〈〈i:+p〉〉q) = {i}.
We use the standard abbreviations for ∨ and→. Moreover, ⊥ abbre-
viates ¬>, [pi]ϕ abbreviates ¬〈pi〉¬ϕ and [[pi]]ϕ abbreviates ¬〈〈pi〉〉¬ϕ.
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2.2.2 Models
The models of our logic are Kripke models with accessibility relations
for the belief and choice operators. Just as in dynamic epistemic log-
ics, there is no accessibility relation for the action operators: instead,
the semantics of actions is in terms of updates of models. There are
moreover two functions which for every world determine the executable
atomic assignments and the atomic assignment that is going to be ex-
ecuted after σ, for every sequence of atomic assignments σ. When σ is
the empty sequence that function therefore determines the next atomic
action that is going to take place.
An ABC model is a six-tuple M = 〈W,A,BS ,BW ,C , T, V 〉 such
that:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds or states;
• A : W −→ 2∆ maps each world to the set of atomic actions that
are physically executable there;
• BS : I −→ 2W×W maps each agent i to his accessibility relation
for strong belief BS i;
• BW : I −→ 2W×W maps each agent i to his accessibility relation
for weak belief BW i;
• C : I −→ 2W×W maps each agent i to his accessibility relation for
choice Ci;
• T : W × ∆∗ −→ ∆ maps each world w and sequence of atomic
actions σ to an action T (w, σ) taking place after the sequence σ
took place;
• V : P −→ 2W is a valuation function associating to each proposi-
tional variable p the set of worlds V (p) where p is true;
and such that the following constraints hold for every i ∈ I:
1. BW i ⊆ BS i,
2. Ci ⊆ BS i,
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3. if w′ ∈ BS i(w) then BS i(w) = BS i(w′), BW i(w) = BW i(w′),
Ci(w) = Ci(w′), Ai(w)|i = Ai(w′)|i, and T (w, σ)|i = T (w′, σ)|i for
every sequence σ,
where BS i(w) = {w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ BS i}, BW i(w) = {w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈
BW i}, and Ci(w) = {w′ : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ Ci}.
BS i(w) is the set of worlds that are compatible with agent i’s strong
beliefs at w, etc. The inclusion of the BW accessible worlds in the
BS accessible worlds is a natural requirement. The inclusion of the
C accessible worlds in the BS accessible worlds means that choice
is realistic, in the sense of [17]: at a given world w, among the set
BS i(w) of worlds that are possible for i, Ci(w) is the set of those worlds
that i prefers. The last constraint means that the agents introspect
their strong and weak beliefs, choices and planned actions. The first
requirement that BS i(w) = BS i(w′) for every w′ ∈ BS i(w) is nothing
but transitivity and euclideanity of the accessibility relation BS i. The
last requirement on the function T means that if after σ, agent i is
going to perform his part δ|i of δ, then i is going to perform exactly
the same action at every world that is compatible with his beliefs. In
particular, if i is going to perform δ|i now (after the empty sequence
of actions nil) then i also believes that he is going to perform δ|i now.
In other words, agents are aware of what they are going to do.
Beyond transitivity and euclideanity of BS i it is often moreover
assumed that every BS i(w) is non-empty, i.e., that the relation BS i
is serial. We do not suppose this here because seriality cannot be
guaranteed under updates, as we will see below. This means that we
allow that an agent may ‘get crazy’, in the sens that we allow for worlds
w where BS i(w) = ∅: at w, no possible world is compatible with i’s
beliefs. Note that unless the accessibility relation is reflexive, the same
is the case in dynamic epistemic logics such as public announcement
logic, cf. [23, 6].
Definition 6 (pointed model) The set of pointed models PM is
the set of tuples (M,w0), where M = 〈W,A,BS ,BW ,C , T, V 〉 is an
ABC model and w0 ∈ W is a world of M .
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2.2.3 Updating models
We now define two basic operations on a given model M : a valuation
update (w.r.t. an atomic action δ) and restriction update of M to by
subset W ′ of the set of possible worlds W (‘relativization’).
Definition 7 (update by an assignment and relativization) Let
M = 〈W,A,BS ,BW ,C , T, V 〉 be a model. Let δ ⊆ ∆ be an atomic ac-
tion. The update ofM by δ is the modelM δ = 〈W,A,BS ,BW ,C , T δ, V δ〉
where:
T δ(w, σ) = T (w, (δ;σ)), for every w ∈ W and σ ∈ ∆∗;
V δ(p) =

W if 〈i, p+〉 ∈ δ for some i ∈ I and δ is consistent in p;
∅ if 〈i, p−〉 ∈ δ for some i ∈ I and δ is consistent in p;
V (p) otherwise;
for every p ∈ P.
Let U be a nonempty subset of W . The relativization of M by U is
the model M |U = 〈W,A,BS ′,BW ′,C ′, T, V 〉 where for every i ∈ I:
BS ′i(w) = BS i(w) ∩ U ;
BW ′i(w) = BW i(w) ∩ U ;
C ′i(w) = Ci(w) ∩ U.
Here are two simple examples. The update of M by the empty
atomic assignment ∅ is not M , but M∅ = 〈W,A,BS ,BW ,C , T ∅, V ∅〉
with V ∅ = V and T δ(w, σ) = T (w, (δ;σ)) for every world w ∈ W and
sequence σ ∈ ∆∗. The relativization of M by W is M |W = M .
The update of a model by an atomic action is clearly a model sat-
isfying the above three constraints that we have imposed on models.
The same is the case for its relativization by a subset U of its set of
possible worlds W (in particular because U has to be nonempty). As
announced in Section 2.2.2, the property of seriality is not preserved
under relativization, which is why we did not require it for the belief
accessibility relations BS i.
Relativization and update can be safely permuted: we have (M |U)δ =
(M δ)|U . We may therefore write M |δU without harm.
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2.2.4 Interpretation of formulas and programs
Formulas are interpreted as subsets of the sets of possible worlds, and
programs are interpreted as functions on the set of pointed models.
This is done by mutual recursion involving four ingredients.
To start with, the satisfaction relation |= ⊆ PM×LABC is:
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= >
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ϕ′
M,w |= Certiϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for every w′ ∈ BS i(w)
M,w |= Plausiϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for every w′ ∈ BW i(w)
M,w |= Choiceiϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for every w′ ∈ Ci(w)
M,w |= 〈pi〉ϕ iff pi ∈ Executable(M,w) and (M,w)pi |= ϕ
M,w) |= 〈〈pi〉〉ϕ iff pi ∈ Happens(M,w) and (M,w)pi |= ϕ
The last two truth conditions involve three functions to be defined
now. The function Executable(M,w) returns the set of programs that
are executable at world w of M :
δ ∈ Executable(M,w) iff δ ∈ A(w)
skip ∈ Executable(M,w)
fail 6∈ Executable(M,w)
pi1; pi2 ∈ Executable(M,w) iff pi1 ∈ Executable(M,w)
and pi2 ∈ Executable(M,w)
if ϕ then pi1 else pi2 ∈ Executable(M,w) iff M,w |= ϕ implies
pi1 ∈ Executable(M,w)
and M,w 6|= ϕ implies
pi2 ∈ Executable(M,w)
The function Happens(M,w) returns the set of programs that are ex-
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ecuted at w in M :
δ ∈ Happens(M,w) iff δ ∈ A(w) and δ ∈ T (w, nil)
skip ∈ Happens(M,w)
fail 6∈ Happens(M,w)
pi1; pi2 ∈ Happens(M,w) iff pi1 ∈ Happens(M,w)
and pi2 ∈ Happens
(
(M,w)pi
)
if ϕ then pi1 else pi2 ∈ Happens(M,w) iff M,w |= ϕ implies pi1 ∈ Happens(M,w)
and M,w 6|= ϕ implies
pi2 ∈ Happens(M,w)
It remains to define the update of a pointed model (M,w) by a com-
plex program. The first and the third line make that this is a partial
function.
(M,w)δ = (M |δ{u∈W :δ∈A(w) and T (u,nil)=δ}, w)
(M,w)skip = (M,w)
(M,w)fail = undef
(M,w)pi1;pi2 = ((M,w)pi1)pi2
(M,w)if ϕ then pi1 else pi2 =
(M,w)
pi1 if M,w |= ϕ
(M,w)pi2 otherwise
For example, (M,w)if > then pi else pi
′
= (M,w)pi. To see that (M,w)δ
may be undefined suppose T (w, nil) 6= δ: then the updated and rela-
tivized model M |δ{u∈W :δ∈A(w) and T (u,nil)=δ} does not contain the world
w, and therefore (M |δ{u∈W :δ∈A(w) and T (u,nil)=δ}, w) is not a legal pointed
model.
Remark 1 An alternative to the above definition of update of pointed
models would be (M,w)δ = (M |δ{u∈W :δ∈A(u)}, w). However, then an
agent would never learn about the other agents’ intentions. Let us
motivate this by an example. Suppose agent i knows that p is false,
does not know that q, and knows that j can make p true but cannot
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make q false. Moreover, i knows that j wants p ↔ q to hold: in i’s
¬p∧q world, j is going to make p true. This situation is expressed by
the following formula:
Certi¬p∧¬Certiq ∧ Certi(〈j:+p〉>∧¬〈j:−q〉>)∧ Certi(q↔〈〈j:+p〉〉>)
Suppose that i learns that j makes p false. As j does this intentionally—
i.e., in agreement with his choices—, i may eliminate the p∧¬q world
because j’s action does not happen there. Then we expect 〈〈j:+p〉〉Certi(p∧¬q),
i.e., after learning the mere occurrence of j:+p, i believes that p∧q.
This is guaranteed by our way of updating pointed models. It is not
guaranteed by the above alternative, which, informally speaking, ‘keeps
too many accessible worlds’ in the set BS i(w).
It might be criticized that our definition too often result in agents
having an empty set of accessible worlds BS i(w). The above definition
can be refined in the following way: when at w agent i strongly believes
that δ does not happen, i.e., when M,w |= Certi¬〈〈δ〉〉>, and when i
learns that δ nevertheless took place then i should not move from the
set of accessible worlds BS i(w) to BS δi (w) = ∅, but rather to the set
{u ∈ BS i(w) : δ ∈ A(u)}. This however comes with some techni-
cal complications: just as in dynamic epistemic logics, we would have
to create several copies of the worlds, and the updated set of possible
worlds would have to be the product of W and the set of agents I.
2.2.5 Logic ABC and logic BC
A LABC formula ϕ is valid in an ABC model M if M,w |= ϕ for ev-
ery world w of M . We say that ϕ is a global consequence of ψ in
ABC, noted ψ |=ABC ϕ, if ϕ is valid in every model M where ψ is
valid. For example, the schema 〈pi〉ϕ → [pi]ϕ is valid: all our pro-
grams are deterministic. Moreover, [δ]Certj〈δ〉>) is ABC valid. Note
that its generalisation [pi]Certj〈pi〉>) is invalid; to see this, replace pi
by if p then i:−p else fail or by 〈〈δ〉〉>. Another example of a ABC
validity is [i:+p, j:−q]Certj(p ∧ ¬q).
The fragment of formulas without dynamic operators will be impor-
tant in the sequel. For ϕ and ψ are in the fragment LBC of LABC, when
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ψ |=ABC ϕ then we also say that ϕ is a logical consequence of ψ in BC
and write ψ |=BC ϕ.
Proposition 1 The validities of BC logic are axiomatized by the prin-
ciples of the basic modal logic K for each of the modal operators: Certi,
Plausi, Choicei, plus the following schemas:
Certiϕ→ Plausiϕ
Certiϕ→ Choiceiϕ
Plausiϕ→ CertiPlausiϕ
¬Plausiϕ→ Certi¬Plausiϕ
Choiceiϕ→ CertiChoiceiϕ
¬Choiceiϕ→ Certi¬Choiceiϕ
For example, the following are theorems of our axiomatisation.
(
Certiϕ ∧ Plausi(ϕ→ ψ)
)→ Plausiψ(
Certiϕ ∧ Choicei(ϕ→ ψ)
)→ Choiceiψ
CertiCertiϕ↔ (Certiϕ ∨ CertiCerti⊥)
CertiPlausiϕ↔ (Plausiϕ ∨ CertiPlausi⊥)
Global logical consequence in BC logic is decidable.
Proposition 2 For LBC formulas ϕ and ψ it is decidable whether
ψ |=BC ϕ.
2.2.6 Decidability of ABC
In this section we prove that the ABC satifiability problem is decidable.
The next propositions collects some valid equivalences by means of
which we can almost eliminate the dynamic operators: we may rewrite
formulas into a normal form in LBC with particular atoms.
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Proposition 3 The following equivalences are valid in ABC logic:
〈〈pi〉〉ϕ↔ 〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ 〈pi〉ϕ
〈〈skip〉〉ϕ↔ ϕ
〈〈fail〉〉ϕ↔ ⊥
〈〈pi1; pi2〉〉ϕ↔ 〈〈pi1〉〉〈〈pi2〉〉ϕ
〈〈if ψ then pi1 else pi2〉〉ϕ↔ (ψ → 〈〈pi1〉〉ϕ) ∧ (¬ψ → 〈〈pi2〉〉ϕ)
By the first equivalence we can ‘almost’ eliminate the operator 〈〈pi〉〉:
we can obtain formulas where 〈〈pi〉〉 is always followed by >. By the re-
maining equivalences we can obtain that pi is atomic. So we can restrict
our attention to formulas where all the occurrences of the happens-
operator take the form 〈〈δ〉〉>.
The next proposition parallels the last four equivalences for case of
the executability operator.
Proposition 4 The following equivalences are valid in ABC logic:
〈skip〉ϕ↔ ϕ
〈fail〉ϕ↔ ⊥
〈pi1; pi2〉ϕ↔ 〈pi1〉〈pi2〉ϕ
〈if ψ then pi1 else pi2〉ϕ↔ (ψ → 〈pi1〉ϕ) ∧ (¬ψ → 〈pi2〉ϕ)
By the above equivalences we can decompose the executability op-
erators 〈pi〉 just as in star-free PDL: we can eliminate all the program
operators from formulas.
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Proposition 5 The following equivalences are valid in ABC logic:
〈δ〉¬ϕ↔ 〈δ〉> ∧ ¬〈δ〉ϕ
〈δ〉(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)↔ 〈δ〉ϕ1 ∧ 〈δ〉ϕ2
〈δ〉Certiϕ↔ 〈δ〉> ∧ Certi[δ]ϕ
〈δ〉Plausiϕ↔ 〈δ〉> ∧ Plausi[δ]ϕ
〈δ〉Choiceiϕ↔ 〈δ〉> ∧ Choicei[δ]ϕ
〈δ〉p↔

> if δ is consistent and there is i ∈ I such that i:+p ∈ δ
⊥ if δ is consistent and there is i ∈ I such that i:−p ∈ δ
p otherwise
〈δ〉〈δ′〉> ↔ 〈δ〉> ∧ 〈δ′〉>
The equivalences for the belief and goal operators correspond to
principles of no forgetting and no learning.1 These equivalences enable
us to distribute the 〈δ〉 over all the connectives but 〈〈pi〉〉 and > (where
we can only eliminate the dynamic operator if δ is empty). The above
propositions 4 and 5 therefore provide a set of reduction axioms for the
‘executable’ operator 〈pi〉 that is complete for all the program operators
and for all the formula operators except > and 〈〈pi〉〉.
Together, propositions 3, 4, and 5 enable us to rewrite any LABC
formula into an equivalent formula that is built by means of the boolean
operators and the modal operators Certi, Plausi, and Choicei from
propositional variables p ∈ P and from what we call dynamic atoms:
formulas of the form either 〈δ〉>, for δ 6= ∅, or 〈δ1〉 · · · 〈δn〉〈〈δ〉〉>. When
n = 0 then we identify the latter dynamic atom with 〈〈δ〉〉>.
It will be convenient to denote dynamic atoms by µ〈〈δ〉〉>, where
µ stands for the sequence 〈δ1〉 · · · 〈δn〉. Then the language L0ABC of
formulas in normal form may be defined by the following BNF:
ϕ := p | 〈δ〉> | µ〈〈δ〉〉> | > | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Certiϕ | Choiceiϕ
1Note that these principles can be generalised to sequences of atomic
programs. They are however invalid for conditionals: for example,
〈if p then i:−p else i:+p〉Certip does not imply Certi[if p then i:−p else i:+p]p
(to see this, consider the case where p is false: then the first is true, while the second
is not necessarily so).
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where p ranges over the set of propositional variables P, δ over the
set of atomic actions ∆, and µ over the set of sequences 〈δ1〉 · · · 〈δn〉.
The p, 〈δ〉>, and µ〈〈δ〉〉> are called atomic formulas. If we identify the
atomic formulas of L0ABC with propositional variables then we obtain
the language of BC.
Let DA(ϕ) be the set of atomic formulas of ϕ. For example, ...
Let the reduction of the formula ϕ be red(ϕ) ∈ L0ABC.
Theorem 1 The equivalence ϕ↔ red(ϕ) is ABC valid.
A reduced formula red(ϕ) can be viewed as a formula of the fragment
LBC of LABC that is built from the set of proposition variables P(ϕ) ∪
DA(ϕ).
Proposition 6 The following formulas are ABC valid:
〈∅〉>
〈〈δ〉〉> → 〈δ〉>
¬(〈〈δ〉〉 ∧ 〈〈δ′〉〉) for δ and δ′ different sets
The first implication is a consequence of the first item of Proposition
3.
Let us define the set of formulas Γϕ axiomatizing the relation be-
tween the dynamic atoms occurring in ϕ:
Γϕ =
{〈∅〉>} ∪{
µ〈〈δ〉〉> → 〈δ〉> : µ〈〈δ〉〉> ∈ DA(ϕ)} ∪{¬(µ〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ µ〈〈δ′〉〉>) : µ〈〈δ〉〉>, µ〈〈δ′〉〉> ∈ DA(ϕ) and δ 6= δ′}
The set Γϕ is finite, and each of its elements is ABC valid. It provides
a background theory under which we may consider dynamic atoms to
be just atoms of LBC.
Theorem 2 Let ϕ ∈ LABC and let red(ϕ) ∈ L0ABC be its reduction.
Then ϕ is ABC valid if and only if Γϕ |=BC red(ϕ), where in the latter
consequence problem the atomic formulas of DA(ϕ) occurring in Γϕ
and red(ϕ) are viewed as arbitrary propositional variables.
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Proof 1 The proof uses that if the sets δ and δ′ are syntactically different
then the implication 〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ 〈〈δ′〉〉> → ⊥ is valid in ABC logic. From
this it follows that the elements of Γϕ are valid in ABC logic.
Corollary 3 Validity of a LABC formula is decidable.
Remark 2 Suppose not only the set of agents I is finite, but also the
set of propositional variables P. Then the set of atomic actions ∆ is
finite, too, and we can formulate principles of intentional action: every
agent intentionally performs his part of the action δ that is going to
take place. Formally:
〈〈δ〉〉> → Certi
∨
{δ′∈∆:δ′|i=δ|i}
〈〈δ′〉〉>
∧
{δ′∈∆:δ′|i=δ|i}
¬〈〈δ′〉〉> → Certi¬〈〈δ〉〉>
So when δ occurs then each of the agents has the intention to perform
his part of δ, and the other way round, this is a necessary condition
of the occurrence of δ. However, we have supposed that P is countably
infinite: the above two principles can therefore not be formulated.
2.3 A logical analysis of trust in ABC
The cognitive theory of Castelfranchi and Falcone, henceforth abbre-
viated C&F, is one of the most prominent [15, 16]. According to C&F,
the trust relation involves a truster i, a trustee j, an action a that is
performed by j and a goal ϕ of i. They defined the predicate Trust as
a goal together with a particular configuration of beliefs of the trustee.
Precisely, i trusts j to do a in order to achieve ϕ if and only if i has
the goal that ϕ and i believes that:
1. j is willing to perform a,
2. j is capable to perform a,
3. j has the power to achieve ϕ by doing a.
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C&F distinguish external from internal conditions in trust assess-
ment: j’s capability to perform a is an external condition, while j’s
willingness to perform a is an internal condition (being about the
trustee’s mental state). Finally, j’s power to achieve ϕ by doing a
relates internal and external conditions: if j performs a then ϕ will re-
sult. Observe that in the power condition, the result is conditioned by
the execution of a; therefore the power condition is independent from
the capability condition. In particular, j may well have the power to
achieve ϕ without being capable to perform a: for example, right now
I have the power to lift a weight of 50kg, but I am not capable to do
this because there is no such weight at hand.
We follow Jones who argued that the core notion of trust need not
involve a goal of the truster [38, 37] and consider a simplified version
of C&F’s definition in terms of a truster, a trustee, an action of the
trustee, and an expected outcome of that action.
C&F did not investigate further how goals, capabilities, willingness
and power have to be defined. A formal analysis of these notions
was undertaken by Herzig et al. [34]. Both C&F and Herzig et al.
only considered trust in the atomic action of another agent and did
not consider trust in complex actions such as our pi. In the sequel
we adapt and extend their approach in order to account for complex
actions. Our analysis differs in one important respect: while theirs is
in terms of a single modal operator of belief, we are going to be more
fine-grained and involve two kinds of belief operators: the strong belief
operators Certi and the weak belief operators Plausi. That j has the
capability to perform a and has the power to achieve ϕ by doing a are
strong beliefs of the trustee, while that j is willing to perform a is a
weak belief. To motivate this consider a prisoners dilemma situation
where agent 1 trusts agent 2 to cooperate: agent 1 knows that agent 2
may defect, i.e., there is a world that is possible for 1 where 2 is going
to defect. However, in the most plausible worlds among the worlds
that are possible for 1 agent 2 is going to cooperate.
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2.3.1 Reducing trust
Complex action expressions involve multiple agents that occur in the
action expressions. We therefore need not identify the trustee as a
separate argument of the trust predicate. Our official definition of the
trust predicate then becomes:
Trust(i, pi, ϕ) def= PlausiCInt(pi) ∧ Certi
(
CExt(pi) ∧ CertiRes(pi, ϕ)
)
where Plausi and Certi are the two modal operators of belief of ABC
and where CInt(pi), CExt(pi), and Res(pi, ϕ) respectively correspond to
items 1, 2 and 3 in C&F’s definition. CInt and CExt stand for the
internal and the external condition in trust assessment.
In the rest of the section we define the predicates CInt(pi), CExt(pi),
and Res(pi, ϕ) in ABC logic and study how trust in a complex action
can be built from trust in its constituents.
The modal operators Plausi and Certi are already primitives of ABC
logic. It remains to define the other components of trust in ABC logic:
CExt(pi) def= 〈pi〉>
CInt(pi) def= 〈pi〉> → 〈〈pi〉〉>
Res(pi, ϕ) def= [pi]ϕ
The definition of the internal condition says that if pi is executable
then pi is going to happen. This is actually a bit weaker than C&F’s
willingness condition. To see this, consider the case where pi is an
atomic action a of some agent j, written j:a. If j cannot perform a, i.e.,
when the external condition fails to hold, then the internal condition
is trivially true. There is however no harm here: as CExt(j:a) is false,
the trust predicate will be false anyway in that case. In the case where
the external condition holds the internal condition reduces to truth of
〈〈j:a〉〉>, and as we have seen in Section 2.2.2, when 〈〈j:a〉〉> is true at
a possible world w then j performs j:a at every world that is chosen
by j at w, i.e., j indeed has the intention to perform a at w.
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Given the above definitions we obtain:
Trust(i, pi, ϕ) = Plausi〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi
(〈〈pi〉〉>→〈pi〉>) ∧ [pi]ϕ)
↔ Plausi〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ)
We take this as our official definition of trust in a complex action. In
words, i’s trust that the complex action pi is going to be performed
and produces ϕ reduces to a weak belief of i that pi is going to occur
and a strong belief of i that pi is executable and that ϕ is among the
effects of pi.
2.3.2 Trust in complex actions
The following validities allow to build trust in a complex action from
trust in its constituents. Their proof makes use of the following ABC
theorems:
[δ]Certiψ ↔ [δ]⊥ ∨ Certi[δ]ψ
[δ]Plausiψ ↔ [δ]⊥ ∨ Plausi[δ]ψ
Certi[δ]ψ → [δ]Certiψ
Plausi[δ]ψ → [δ]Plausiψ
〈δ〉> ∧ [δ]ϕ↔ 〈δ〉ϕ
which follow from the equivalences in Proposition 5 (precisely, the re-
duction axioms for Cert and Plaus and the determinism of δ).
Theorem 4 The following equivalences are ABC valid:
Trust(i, fail, ϕ)↔ ⊥
Trust(i, skip, ϕ)↔ Certiϕ
For sequences and conditionals we only have implications.
Theorem 5 The following implications are ABC valid:
Trust(i, (pi1; pi2), ϕ)→ Trust(i, pi1,>)
Trust(i, (δ; pi), ϕ)→ Certi[δ]Trust(i, pi, ϕ)
¬CertiPlausi⊥ ∧ Trust(i, δ,>) ∧ Certi[δ]Trust(i, pi, ϕ)→ Trust(i, (δ; pi), ϕ)
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Proof 2 The first implication is straightforward. For the second im-
plication we have:
Trust(i, (δ; pi), ϕ)↔ Plausi〈〈δ〉〉〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi〈δ〉〈pi〉> ∧ Certi[δ][pi]ϕ
(because Cert and [δ] are normal)
→ Plausi[δ]〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi[δ]
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ)
(because programs are deterministic)
→ CertiPlausi[δ]〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ CertiCerti[δ]
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ)
(by Proposition 1)
→ Certi[δ]Plausi〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi[δ]Certi
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ)
(by Proposition 5)
↔ Certi[δ]Trust(i, pi, ϕ)
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For the third implication:
¬CertiPlausi⊥ ∧ Trust(i, δ,>) ∧ Certi[δ]Trust(i, pi, ϕ)
↔ ¬CertiPlausi⊥ ∧
(
Plausi〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ Certi
(〈δ〉> ∧ [δ]>)) ∧(
Certi[δ]Plausi〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi[δ]Certi
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ))
(because Cert and [δ] are normal)
→ ¬CertiPlausi⊥ ∧ Plausi〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ Certi〈δ〉> ∧
Certi
(
[δ]⊥ ∨ Plausi[δ]〈〈pi〉〉>
) ∧ Certi([δ]⊥ ∨ Certi[δ](〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ))
(by Proposition 5)
→ ¬CertiPlausi⊥ ∧ Plausi〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ Certi〈δ〉>∧
CertiPlausi[δ]〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ CertiCerti[δ]
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ)
(because Cert and [δ] are normal)
↔ ¬CertiPlausi⊥ ∧ Plausi〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ Certi〈δ〉>∧(
CertiPlausi⊥ ∨ Plausi[δ]〈〈pi〉〉>
)
∧
(
CertiCerti⊥ ∨ Certi[δ]
(〈pi〉> ∧ [pi]ϕ))
(by Proposition 1)
→ Plausi〈〈δ〉〉> ∧ Certi〈δ〉> ∧ Plausi[δ]〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi
(
[δ]〈pi〉> ∧ [δ][pi]ϕ)
(because Cert and [δ] are normal)
→ Plausi〈〈δ〉〉〈〈pi〉〉> ∧ Certi
(〈δ〉〈pi〉> ∧ [δ][pi]ϕ)
(by Proposition 1)
↔ Trust(i, (δ; pi), ϕ)
Note that the last two equivalences cannot be generalised from
atomic δ to conditionals.
Theorem 6 The following implications are ABC valid:
Trust(i, if ψ then pi1 else pi2, ϕ)→(
Certiψ → Trust(i, pi1, ϕ)
) ∧ (Certi¬ψ → Trust(i, pi2, ϕ))
Proof 3 It suffices to prove(
Trust(i, if ψ then pi1 else pi2, ϕ)
) ∧ Certiψ)→ Trust(i, pi1, ϕ).
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We prove that under Certiψ, the components of Trust(i, if ψ then pi1 else pi2, ϕ)
)
imply the components of Trust(i, pi1, ϕ): first, Plausi〈〈if ψ then pi1 else pi2〉〉>∧
Certiψ → Plausi〈〈pi1〉〉>; second, Certi〈if ψ then pi1 else pi2〉> ∧
Certiψ → Certi〈pi1〉>; third, Certi[if ψ then pi1 else pi2]>∧Certiψ →
Certi[pi1]>.
Let us consider a stronger version of theorem 6 where the consequent
is replaced by
Certi
((
ψ → Trust(i, pi1, ϕ)
) ∧ (¬ψ → Trust(i, pi2, ϕ)))
However, together with ¬Certiψ∧¬Certi¬ψ. they imply ¬Certi¬Trust(i, pi1, ϕ)∧
¬Certi¬Trust(i, pi2, ϕ), i.e.,
¬Certi¬
(
Plausi〈〈pi1〉〉> ∧ Certi(〈pi1〉 ∧ [pi1]ϕ)
) ∧
¬Certi¬
(
Plausi〈〈pi2〉〉> ∧ Certi(〈pi2〉 ∧ [pi2]ϕ)
))
,
which by the introspection principles is equivalent to
(
Plausi〈〈pi1〉〉> ∧ Certi(〈pi1〉 ∧ [pi1]ϕ)
) ∧ (Plausi〈〈pi2〉〉> ∧ Certi(〈pi2〉 ∧ [pi2]ϕ))),
i.e., to Trust(i, pi1, ϕ) ∧ Trust(i, pi2, ϕ). Therefore, in the case where i
is in doubt about the condition of the if-then-else then i has to trust
both actions pi1 and pi2 to occur and to achieve ϕ. This means that pi1
and pi2 are equivalent. Indeed, for example for, if they are both atomic
they have to be syntactically identical according to Proposition 6.
2.3.3 Reasoning tasks involving trust
There are at least 3 different reasoning tasks involving the trust pred-
icate.
• Trust validity problem: the problem of deciding validity of formu-
las containing the trust predicate allows us to analyze the general
properties of an execution in some system. This can be related to
trust concepts in epistemic games.
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• Model checking: decide whether in a current system, trust can be
asserted for some actions, and for which reason.
• Abduction: by analyzing the conditions under which the goal is
not satisfied, we can define a set of formulas that can be seen as
explanations for failure of trust.
Such reasoning tasks come up naturally in various domains and con-
texts, requiring many variations of the concept of trust. Our logic
provides a common trust definition that can be used in different trust-
based decision procedures. The instantiation depends on the definition
of the reasoning procedure to be used.
Validity problem
When reasoning about trust, checking the validity of a formula allows
us to derive general properties from some system specification. When
a specific implementation of a system satisfies the specification and
the specification implies some property then the implementation is
guaranteed to have that property. This appears to be very similar to
the game theoretical approaches towards trust.
To illustrate this, we will use an instance of the prisoners dilemma,
with two agents i,j. Each agent respectively controls the variables coopi
and coopj, where the simple action {i : coop+i , j : coop+j } expresses that
the two agent are cooperating. The set of all possible simple actions
corresponds to pure strategy profiles.
The uncertainty of i about the actions of j when i decides to coop-
erate corresponds to the formula
Certi(〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop+j 〉〉> ∨ 〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop−j 〉〉>).
The payoff of i can be associated to the following constrains on his
choices: Certi(〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop+j 〉〉> ∨ 〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop−j 〉〉>) →
Choicei〈〈{i : coop+i , j : coop+j }〉〉> and Certi(〈〈i : coop−i , j : coop+j 〉〉> ∨
〈〈i : coop−i , j : coop−j 〉〉>) → Choicei〈〈{i : coop−i , j : coop+j }〉〉>, mean-
ing that if i chooses to cooperate, he would prefer that the payoff rather
comes from the cooperation of j since it maximises his utility, and if i
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decides to defect then he would prefer that j cooperates, for the same
reason.
Our logic seems to offer the tools that we need in order to analyze
the epistemic state of the agents i and j that may lead them to adopt
some strategy profile, i.e., if Γ is a formula that describes the current
epistemic state of our agents then |= Γ → δ. This means that γ
supports the strategy profile δ, where to match our past example,
δ ∈ {{i : coop•i , j : coop?j} | •, ? ∈ {+,−}}.
Example 1 Cooperation (δc = i : coop+i , j : coop+j ) can be ensured by
the following epistemic state:
Γ = Trust(i, δc) ∧ Trust(j, δc).
The formula Γ states that each agent believes that if he is willing to
cooperate then the other agent will do the same.
Example 2 Using the same idea, the Nash equilibrium
δn = {i : coop−i , j : coop−j }
can be explained by the distrust of each agent toward a cooperative be-
havior from the other agent. This corresponds to the following formula:
Γ =
∧
i
Certi(
∨
•∈{+,−}
〈〈{i : coop+i , j : coop•j}〉〉> →
〈〈{i : coop+i , j : coop−j }〉〉>) ∧ Choicei〈〈δc〉〉>.
The following example illustrates how complex actions can corre-
spond to strategy profiles in repeated games.
Example 3 The agent i decides to adopt reciprocity (cooperate if j
cooperated last time or else defect), this strategy will correspond to the
following formula:
〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop+j 〉〉 ( 〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop+j 〉〉>∨
〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop−j 〉〉> ) ∧
〈〈i : coop+i , j : coop−j 〉〉 ( 〈〈i : coop−i , j : coop+j 〉〉>∨
〈〈i : coop−i , j : coop−j 〉〉> )
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Model checking problem
The Model checking problem corresponds to the main reasoning proce-
dure for our logic. Suppose given a model pm ∈ PM that corresponds
to the current state in which an epistemic multi-agent system is (see
example in our last section). We can verify if:
• An agent i believes that a goal of his can be achieved by executing
a complex action pi, by checking if pm |= Trust(i, pi).
• A check whether pm |= ¬Trust(i, pi) will verify that i does not
trust that the action would bring about ϕ (also given what he
knows).
In the second case where pm |= ¬Trust(i, pi), we may want to check
furthermore why trust predicate does not hold:
• pm |= Certi((CExt(pi) ∧ CInt(pi)) → Res(pi, ϕ)) means that I be-
lieve the action would not realise the goal;
• pm |= Certi(¬CExt(pi) ∨ ¬CInt(pi))): means that the action will
not occur.
Abductive reasoning
Using the model checking problem and for the sake of analyzing the
same system as for the model checking procedure, we can define an
abduction procedure, that tries to explain the truth value of the trust
predicate.
Definition 8 Suppose given an agent i and a complex action pi. Sup-
pose given two finite sets of formulas, respectively called PE and NE.
Positive and negative explanations have to respect the following con-
strains:
• The formulas of PE are mutually exclusive and |= ϕ′ → ϕ for all
ϕ′ ∈ PE.
• The formulas of NE are mutually excursive and |= ϕ′ → ¬ϕ for
all ϕ′ ∈ PE
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Given a model pm ∈ PM , an explanation of a positive evaluation
of the trust of i in pi to achieve ϕ (resp. negative evaluation of trust)
is a formula ϕ′ of PE (resp. of NP ) such that pm |= Trust(i, pi, ϕ) ∧
〈〈pi〉〉ϕ′.
The abductive procedure that we define can be seen as a specific
analysis of the primary predicate Res(ϕ) since we are only interested
in the relation of the action pi with the realisation (or non-realisation)
of the goal.
This procedure allows us to help a user to choose between different
actions (to be executed), by providing explanations for the result of
the model checking procedure.
2.4 Case study: searching for accommo-
dation
Our Goal in this section is to show how our logic can be used to analyze
trust assertions, in a SOA context.
To do so, we will use a case study related to the process of searching
accommodation that a student would perform using the services that
the French student union CROUS offers to him.
In this case study:
• The student is identified as a service consumer that needs to reach
a goal (in our case, accessing a list of accommodations potentially
of interest to him), and this, by choosing between different pro-
cesses that help him to reach his goal.
• The CROUS services are identified as a set of composed services
that provide the essential information using different compositions.
We will define 2 service compositions.
We remark that our logic is used in the process of analyzing the
opportunities of interaction and not during the actual interaction. Our
model allows the student to:
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Figure 2.1: composed service : AccIntResearch
• Represent the execution of a composition workflow and the behav-
ior of its different services by using the student knowledge about
the modeled system;
• Assert if the student can trust the service composition to achieve
his goal and in the same time, fulfilling the requirements that the
student would want to see verified (mostly related to security and
privacy issues);
• Extract some information about the different properties of interac-
tion ( arguments for or against the interaction, recommendations
to achieve the goal, etc).
2.4.1 CROUS services presentation
We start by sketching an informal description of the different elements
that we use in our case study, followed by a global schema of execution
of the study cases; then we show how our logic can be used to provide
an analysis.
We start in this section by describing two composed services that
the CROUS allows students to use for searching accommodation.
• The first one is the AccIntResearch service depicted in Figure 2.1.
This service returns the list of accommodations that the internal
services of the CROUS propose. The execution of the composed
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Figure 2.2: composed service : AccExtResearch
service is defined as follows:
1. The first service executed is AcomCrousIN (ACIN) which is
a service that takes the information and preferences of the
student and defines a set of public sources to contact (in our
case, the HLM services, the CROUS Accommodation reposi-
tory (CAR), schools dormitory services (SDR)).
2. A test is then run for each one of the services that have been
identified, if the condition for admission of the student is ful-
filled, contact the appropriate service.
3. Each service will then answer to an aggregation service called
AccomCrous2 that will sum the results (available accomoda-
tions, application files and contact adresses ) and sends them
back to the student.
• The second one is the AccExtResearch service. This service in-
cludes external sources (private renters or estate agencies) into the
research process that follows the schema presented in Figure 2.2 :
The execution of the composed service is defined as follows:
1. The first service executed is AccomCrous1 which takes the per-
sonal information and preferences of the student. This time,
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the service will trigger a new searching process (due to the
precise desire of the student to allow external sources to be
interrogated expressed in his preferences).
2. The AccomCrous1 sends the student information (including
email and phone number) to a CROUS repository services,
that searches for the accommodations that satisfies the criteria
specified by the student.
3. A conditional path is then triggered: if the list of accommoda-
tions retrieved by the repository is nonempty, the results are
sent to the student (by email), otherwise, the personal informa-
tion and the request of the student are sent to a list of external
renters and agencies (private companies). The condition will
be described by the atomic proposition OutputEmpty.
4. Each private service Ri will have the choice to either ignore
the demand of the student, or to contact him by email or by
phone (using the information provided by the CROUS to Ri).
2.4.2 Beliefs and goals of the student
The student (noted s) is considered as an agent in the interaction. His
goal is to find a list of accommodations while making sure that his
phone number is not provided to a private company (in order to avoid
ads for example, or unwanted calls) during the composition. To model
the belief of the student, we suppose that he knows the description
of the two composed services AccIntResearch and AccExtResearch,
which are made public before interaction (either via a public procedure
description or proposed by the composition engine).
Thus the student believes that the services involved in the two com-
positions will behave as stated stated in Section 2.4.1 once he begins
the interaction. This means he believes that upon his request the
workflow of the composition will be respected. As a consequence his
beliefs about the AccExtResearch service depend on his belief about
the emptiness of the list of accommodations retrieved by the CROUS
services. There are 3 cases:
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1. He believes that the list is nonempty. Either he has performed a
preliminary search or he got this information via some other way.
In this case, his belief is expressed by the logical formula:
Certs¬OutputEmpty
2. He believes that the list is empty. In this case, his belief is ex-
pressed by the logical formula :
CertsOutputEmpty
3. He has no belief about the emptiness of the list, which is expressed
by the logical formula :
(¬Certs¬OutputEmpty) ∧ (¬CertsOutputEmpty)
The goal of the student is tied with his preferences and the action
he requested.
Concerning his preferences, we suppose that the student agrees to
share his email and phone number with any public institution but only
agrees to share his email with private companies. As a consequence we
may infer that one of his goals is to prevent private companies to access
his phone number. We use the atomic proposition PhonePrivate to
represent that a private company is given access to his phone number.
Concerning his request, we assume that the goal of the student is
to obtain a list of accommodations. We use the atomic proposition
Accommodation to represent that the student obtained this list.
With these notation, the goal of the student is represented by the
logical formula :
Goal(s,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate) def= ChoicesF (Accommodation
∧¬PhonePrivate)
2.4.3 Trust analysis
The analysis process is the process of satisfiability checking for the trust
formula associated to the composed action and goal of the student. If
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the trust formula is satisfiable given the modeled beliefs and goals,
then the trust is established. In the other case, an in depth analysis of
the failure of satisfiability may give the reasons why the trust cannot
be established.
AccIntResearch service.
In the case of the AccIntResearch service, the complex action is ex-
pressed with the atomic actions in the following way:
AccIntResearch = ACIN; (Cond1?;CAR+Cond2?;HLM+Cond3?; SDR);ACOUT
The trust formula is Trust(s,AccIntResearch,Accommodation∧¬PhonePrivate)
which is, by our definition :
Trust(s,AccIntResearch,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate) def=
Goal(s,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate)
∧Certs(CExt(AccIntResearch) ∧ CInt(AccIntResearch)
∧Res(AccIntResearch,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate))
Since no agent involved in the composition is a private company,
the privacy goal is fulfilled by default. The satisfiability of this trust
formula only depends on whether the agents will effectively perform
the actions. In our setting, given the beliefs of the student, this holds
and the trust is asserted.
AccExtResearch service.
In the case of the AccIntResearch service, the complex action is ex-
pressed with the atomic actions in the following way :
AccExtResearch = ACIN ;CAR; if OutputEmpty
then ContactExternalServices; (R1 +R2 +R3)
else Send to student
The trust formula is
Trust(s,AccExtResearch,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate) def=
Goal(s,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate)
∧Certs(CExt(AccExtResearch) ∧ CInt(AccExtResearch)
∧Res(AccExtResearch,Accommodation ∧ ¬PhonePrivate))
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The satisfiability of this trust formula depends on the beliefs of the
student about the emptiness of the list of accommodations retrieved
by the CROUS. We detail the three cases presented in Section 2.4.2 :
1. Certs¬OutputEmpty. Since the student believes that the list is
not empty, he believes that the CROUS services will send him the
list of accommodation without sending his personal information to
any company; thus the trust formula is satisfied.
2. CertsOutputEmpty. Since the student believes that the list is
empty, he believes that the CROUS will send his personal infor-
mation, including phone number, to the external services which
include private companies. The trust formula is not satisfied in
this case.
3. (¬Certs¬OutputEmpty) ∧ (¬CertsOutputEmpty). The student
has no belief about the emptiness of the list. As a consequence,
he must take into account the two possible executions of the com-
posed service. Since the execution triggered when the list is empty
involves sending his personal information to private companies, he
cannot trust the composite service for fulfilling his goals. The trust
formula is not satisfied.
In the cases 2 and 3, the trust formula is not satisfied. An automated
analysis of the formula may point the trust problem. In case 2, the trust
problem arises from the workflow of the composite service: the student
believes that following this workflow, his phone number will be sent to
private companies. In case 3, the trust problem also arises from the
workflow of the composite service but it depends on the propositional
variable OutputEmpty. Such an analysis can be used to prompt the
student about the trust issues in a precise way. For example, he can be
prompted in case 2 that his phone number will be provided to private
companies whereas in case 3 he may be prompted that if the list is
empty, his phone number may be provided to private companies.
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Case study conclusion
This case study shows how the trust model can be used in an e-service
composition context. This first step is to aggregate the general beliefs
of the user, using, amongst other sources, his preference set. This
step allows also to compute a part of his goals (in our example his
privacy goals). The next step is to add the beliefs and goals about
the complex action used to achieve his request. This action can be
provided by a service composition algorithm. Assuming that the user
trusts the algorithm, this provides the beliefs about the workflow of
the composed service. The query itself provides the second part of his
goals.
When this components are known, the trust formula can be stated
and its satisfiability can be analyzed. The analysis procedure is not
given in this document; it should allow, whenever the trust formula
is unsatisfiable, to give information to the user about why the trust
cannot be achieved.
2.5 Conclusion and discussion
Logic-based approaches for trust offer a robust way to deal with situa-
tions of interaction where there is a risk for the trustee. This robustness
comes from the fact that while the concept of trust stays encoded in
the axiomatization of the logic (in our case, an epistemic concept that
links trust to the beliefs and choices of the truster), we can still adapt
the logic by integrating more information about the applicative context
in which our logic will be used.
Our work in this chapter was used as a trust component in a personal
information management system or Pims, where information exchange
takes place by composing data access services within a network of
pims. In this applicative context, our notion of program is associated
to service composition, the goal is associated to query described by a set
of data to be retrieved (became known to the query agent) associated to
some preferences upon the quality for resources and privacy (conditions
on the believes of the agents of the network, about each others), This
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use of our logic was illustrated in the previous study case.
While the external conditions of trust are associated to the exe-
cutability of the different services of the composition and resources
availability, the internal condition will be related to the interaction
protocol, and the reliability of the description of the different services.
Our next chapter presents an extension of this approach by studying
the process in which, trust as a beliefs is actually generated, by doing
so, our goal is to define abductive mechanisms that can be usable to
justify an agent’s ’trust state’.
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Chapter 3
Nonmonotonic trust
operator
3.1 Motivation: NMR and its view of trust
In the last chapter, we presented an epistemic conceptualization of
trust. In that model, trust was viewed as a derivative consequence of
the epistemic state of the truster.
This view does not endorse any assumptions on how such knowledge
is acquired, albeit its importance to understand how the trust state of
an agent is constructed. Furthermore, ambiguities can arise when we
emphasize the causes of a truster trusting someone . This comes from
the non existence of a clear mechanism in our logic that expresses trust
construction.
Starting from the point of view that trust plays a major role in
dealing with risk under uncertainty, the nature of such uncertainty
can be a key to propose more efficient models. Until now, the type
of uncertainty that we encountered, is of a combinatorial nature: all
possible cases are known to the truster, which as a decision process
decides how to act under a total description of the situation. A more
interesting context to study trust would be of uncertainty as a lack
of descriptive material. A simple example of such type of uncertainty
can be found in [72], which can be used to describe different agents
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that interact in the same context, without the same vocabulary. In
our context, a truster may need to interact with a trustee that uses
a different vocabulary to describe the context of interaction, which
means that they may have different views on their interactions.
In the last chapter, trust was identified with the epistemic states
of the agent, in which our trust formula will be satisfied, i.e. to the
trust formula Trust(i, j, pi), we associate the set of all epistemic theo-
ries (closed and complete set of Certiϕ formulas) of the truster i, that
contain the formulas Trust(i, j, pi). Our goal in this chapter is to de-
fine a mechanism (more precise than logical deduction) to identify in
each epistemic state, the induced trust. In this work we consider non-
monotonic reasoning as the framework to implement such mechanism.
Our choice is supported by the parallels that can be made between
deriving how trust is used in social interaction in common sense [51]
and causal [29] reasoning treatment in nonmonotonic frameworks, in
both cases there is incomplete knowledge from which conclusions are
drawn that are not supported by classical logical inference.
Henceforth, trust interpreted as a concept related to interaction in
a social context, is a specialization of the notion of causality to social
interaction.
Our work explores this point of view, identifying trust to a reasoning
process, instead of just epistemic states that satisfies it. We present
trust as a specialized version of causal reasoning, applied to social
interactions [11]. Such specialization means that trust is primary a
subjective type of causal reasoning. Also, abstract trust will be as-
sociated to the notion of causal theory -which we call, trust theory-.
Such theories are rules that distinguish logical consequences from trust
derived facts. Situational trust is identified to a trust theory, which to
each context of application, derives different trusted facts.
To do so, we adapt the framework of production and causal infer-
ence that was introduced by Bochman [9], to work within the context
of ABC. Production inference relations are one of the most primary
and intuitive extensions of classical logic, to implement nonmonotonic
reasoning. They are based on the syntactic notion of production rules
(where a production rule A⇒ B will be read: A produces, or causes,
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B). Our formalism will be used to implement causal and abductive
reasoning done in an epistemic context, in order to define inference
procedures related to Trust use.
The following sections will present a brief review of production in-
ference relations interpreted using a nonmonotonic semantics and how
it can be used to implement both causal reasoning and abductive rea-
soning.
We will then show how to adapt production inference relations to
work with ABC logic formulas and how to use our epistemic inference
relations to implement nonmonotonic reasoning within multi-agent sys-
tems.
We will use the resulting framework to present three distinct notions
of trust.
And finally we will present a multi-agent version of our system, as
a new modal logic.
3.2 Production inference relations
Nonmonotonic reasoning consists in ‘jumping to conclusions’ [28] it is
a way of concluding from the absence of information and allows to de-
duce more from a hypothesis than what classical logic licenses. Produc-
tion relations are variants of Makinson & Van der Torre’s input-output
logic [47]. They are used to specify nonmonotonic reasoning procedure
that extend classical propositional calculus to support nonmonotonic
consequence relation. Our exposition in this section follows [10], to
which we refer the reader for more details about the different proofs
related to production relations.
Production relation is a relation defined between propositional for-
mulas. In what follow p,q,· · · denote atomic propositions, ϕ,ψ,· · ·
denote propositional formulas and |= and Th denote respectively the
classical notions of logical entailment and its corresponding logical clo-
sure operator.
Definition 9 A production inference relation is a binary relation ⇒
defined on the set of classical propositions, that satisfies the following
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postulates:
(Strengthening) If ϕ |= ψ and ψ ⇒ θ, then ϕ⇒ θ;
(Weakening) If ϕ⇒ ψ and ψ |= θ, then ϕ⇒ θ;
(And) If ϕ⇒ ψ and ϕ⇒ θ, then ϕ⇒ ψ ∧ θ;
(Truth) > ⇒ >;
(falsity) ⊥ ⇒ ⊥.
An element ϕ⇒ ψ of ⇒ will be called a production rule.
It is worth mentioning that the main difference between the classical
notion of entailment and the notion of production is that reflexivity
(ϕ⇒ ϕ) is not guaranteed for the later.
In what follows, production rules are extended to arbitrary sets of
propositions as follow: for any set Φ of propositions, we define Φ⇒ ψ
as follows:
Φ⇒ ϕ iff ∧u⇒ ϕ, for some finite u ⊆ Φ
We associate to ⇒, its corresponding derivability operator
C(Φ) = {ϕ | Φ⇒ ϕ}
.
Remark that C is monotonic:
if Γ ⊆ Φ, then C(Γ) ⊆ C(Φ)
and deductively closed:
for any Φ, C(Φ) = Th(C(Φ))
Even so, C is still not inclusive: Φ ⊆ C(Φ) does not always hold. Also,
it is not idempotent, that is, C(C(Φ)) can be different from C(Φ).
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The main semantics used to interpret production relations is based
on the notion of bimodels, where a bimodel is just a pair of deductively
closed set of formulas, viewed as an initial and a possible final states.
Definition 10 A pair of consistent, deductively closed sets of formulas
will be called a classical bimodel. A set of classical bimodels will be
called a classical binary semantics.
We use the symbols u, v, etc. for classical bimodels. A semantical
reformulation of the notion of bimodels as a pair of sets of interpreta-
tions is possible as follows:
〈u, v〉 ≡ 〈{I | I |= u}, {I | I |= v}〉
A classical binary semantics can also be seen as a binary relation
between deductively closed theories. We will use the notation uBv to
denote the fact that the bimodel 〈u, v〉 belongs to the classical binary
semantics B.
Definition 11 (validity) A production rule ϕ⇒ ψ will be said to be
valid in a classical binary semantics B if, for any bimodel 〈u, v〉 from
B, ϕ ∈ u only if ψ ∈ v.
In regards to the notion of validity, the syntactic and semantics
formulations of bimodels are equivalent.
Lemma 7 For any classical binary semantics B, the associated set of
production rules that are valid in B, is a production relation (denoted
⇒B).
A completeness result can be obtained by constructing for any pro-
duction relation ⇒, its canonical semantics
B⇒ = {〈w, C(w)〉 | w is a consistent and deductively closed set of formulas}
Theorem 8 If B⇒ is the canonical semantics for a production relation
⇒, then, for any set of propositions Φ and any formula ϕ,
Φ⇒ ϕ iff ϕ ∈ v, for any bimodel (w, v) ∈ B⇒ such that Φ ⊆ w
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Corollary 9 A binary relation ⇒ on the set of propositions is a pro-
duction inference relation if and only if it is determined by a classical
binary semantics.
The notion of causal theory is the main way to specify production
relations. By a causal theory we mean a set of production rules. Since
all postulates for production relations are Horn ones, for any causal
theory ∆ there exists at least production relation that includes ∆. We
will denote it by ⇒∆, while C∆ will denote the derivability operator.
⇒∆ is the set of all the production rules that can be derived from ∆
using the postulates for production relations.
If ∆(Φ) denotes the set of all proposition that can be directly pro-
duced from Φ by ∆, that is
∆(Φ) = {ψ | (ϕ⇒ ψ) ∈ ∆, for some ϕ ∈ Φ}
A description of ⇒∆, can be formulated as follows:
Proposition 7 C∆(Φ) = Th(∆(Th(Φ)))
3.2.1 Regular production inference
As presented above, productions relations offer a way to link assump-
tions to their conclusion in a more deliberate way than the classical
entailment relation. Still they may seem too restrictive to handle com-
plex type of reasoning. For example, production relations do not allow
to reuse productions as inputs to produce more formulas.
Such mechanism needs to be specified as a postulate. The cut mech-
anism is a way to implement reusability of rules as follow:
(Cut) If ϕ⇒ ψ and ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ θ , then ϕ⇒ θ
An equivalent constraint can be defined for the production operator:
C(Φ ∪ C(Φ)) ⊆ C(Φ)
A production relation that satisfies the cut mechanism is called a
regular production relation. This special type of production relation
satisfies a certain number of properties. The most notable ones are:
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(Transitivity) If ϕ ⇒ ψ and ψ ⇒ θ, then ϕ ⇒ θ. This corresponds
to the following constraint on the operator: C(C(Γ)) ⊆ C(Γ).
(Constraint) If ϕ⇒ ψ, then ϕ∧¬ψ ⇒ ⊥. This property introduces a
special kind of production rule, ϕ⇒ ⊥, as a way to describe purely
factual informations (by saying that ϕ is explanatory inconsistent
and should not hold in any output state).
(Coherence) If ϕ ⇒ ¬ϕ, then ϕ ⇒ ⊥. As a special case of Con-
straint, coherence expresses that if a proposition produces propo-
sitions that are incompatible with it, then it is explanatory incon-
sistent.
Regular production relations can be described using the following
notion of theory.
Definition 12 A set Φ of propositions will be called a theory of a
production relation, if it is deductively closed, and C(Φ) ⊆ Φ.
Φ will be called a theory of a causal theory ∆, if it is a theory of
⇒∆.
Furthermore, theories that are worlds, i.e., a complete deductively
closed set of propositions, have a very simple characterization of regular
production relations:
Lemma 10 A world α is a theory of a regular production relation if
and only if α 6⇒ ⊥
Regular production relations can be characterized using only inclu-
sive bimodels (〈u, v〉 such that v ⊆ u). The corresponding semantics
will be called consistent -or inclusive- binary semantics.
Theorem 11 ⇒ is a regular production relation if an only if it is
generated by a consistent binary semantics.
We denote ⇒r∆ the least regular production relation containing a
causal theory ∆. As a consequence of the above characterization, we
obtain a constructive characterization of ⇒r∆.
Proposition 8 Φ⇒r∆ ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Th(∆(u)), for any ∆-theory
u, such that Φ ⊆ u
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A simple characterization can be obtained by using Cl(Φ) to denote
the least ∆-theory containing Φ.
Corollary 12 Given Cr∆, a production operator that corresponds to the
causal theory ∆:
Cr∆(Φ) = Th(∆(Cl(Φ)))
Using regular production relations, we can define a proper notion
of equivalence, that allows to group propositions in sets with elements
substituable in production rules. Namely two propositions ϕ and ψ
are production equivalent with respect to a production relation, if > ⇒
(ϕ↔ ψ) holds. Then we have
Lemma 13 Propositions ϕ and ψ are production-equivalent with re-
spect to a regular production relation ⇒ if and only if any occurrence
of ϕ can be replaced by ψ in the rules of ⇒.
Until now, we considered a monotonic interpretation of production
inference, the next definition presents an alternative nonmonotonic
semantics, determined by production relations in a natural way, pro-
viding a logical basis for a particular form of nonmonotonicity1 .
Definition 13 .
• A set of propositions Φ is called an exact theory, if it is consistent
and Φ = C(Φ).
• A set Φ of propositions is an exact theory of a causal theory ∆,
if it is an exact theory of ⇒∆
• A general nonmonotonic semantics of a production inference rela-
tion (or a causal theory) is the set of all its exact theories.
Using a general exact semantics correspond to accepting the ex-
planatory closure assumptions, which stipulates that any proposition
1Due to the fact that the production operator C is not reflexive, an important
distinction among theories of a production relation can be made.
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is actually produced (explained by) propositions that are accepted in
this state.
To this point, we showed how to associate to a regular production
relation, a general nonmonotonic semantics, without defining a definite
notion of validity. This is mainly due to the fact that different notion
of validities are candidate. Standard one are based on total, minimal
or maximal inclusion, and each one of these validity notions shows pros
and cons, depending on the application our logic is meant for. Nev-
ertheless, the nonmonotonic nature of the validity is preserved, since
adding new rules to a production relation changes nonmonotonically
its semantics.
Exact theories can be seen as fixed points of the production operator
C, and since this operator is monotonic and continuous, exact theories
(and hence the nonmonotonic semantics) always exist. For regular
production relations, the least exact theory coincides with C(>), that
is, with the set of propositions that are produced by tautologies. In
addition, the union of any chain of exact theories (with respect to
set inclusion) is an exact theory, so any exact theory is included in a
maximal such theory.
Lemma 14 If ⇒ is a regular production relation associated to a pro-
duction operator C, and Φ ⊆ C(Φ) for any set of formulas Φ, then C(Φ)
is an exact theory of ⇒.
An equivalent lemma can be defined for causal theories
Lemma 15 Γ is an exact theory of a causal theory ∆ if and only if
Γ = Th(∆(Γ)), for any set of formulas Γ.
Regular production relations are an adequate and maximal logical
framework for reasoning with exact theories
Definition 14 Two causal theories will be called nonmonotonically
equivalent if they have the same general nonmonotonic semantics.
The next lemma links causal theories and regular production rela-
tions under general nonmonotonic semantics.
Lemma 16 Any causal theory ∆ is nonmonotonically equivalent to
⇒r∆.
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The following holds:
Corollary 17 Regularly equivalent theories are nonmonotonically equiv-
alent.
But the inverse of the last equivalence does not hold, due to the mono-
tonicity of regular equivalence, that can not be guaranteed when new
rules are added to regularly equivalent relations. This shortcoming
means that we may need a stronger monotonic notion of equivalence,
that will be preserved under the addition of new rules.
Definition 15 Two causal theories Φ and Γ will be said to be strongly
equivalent if, for any set Θ of causal rules, Φ∪Θ is nonmonotonically
equivalent to Γ ∪Θ.
This kind of independence can be seen as context free equivalence
between causal theories.
Theorem 18 Two causal theories are strongly equivalent if and only
if they are regularly equivalent.
The above result implies, in effect, that regular production relations
are maximal inference relations that are adequate for reasoning with
causal theories: any postulate that is not valid for regular production
relations can be ’falsified’ by finding a suitable extension of two causal
theories that would determine different nonmonotonic semantics, and
hence would produce different nonmonotonic conclusions.
Exact theories are fixed points, where all elements can be explained.
Such semantics make regular production relation a promising frame-
work to study abductive reasoning.
3.2.2 Abducive production inference
A special case of production relation can be used to implement abduc-
tive reasoning.
We start by defining an abductive framework as a pair A = 〈Cn,A〉
where Cn is a consequence relation and A is a set of distinguishable
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propositions called abducibles. A proposition ϕ is explainable in an
abductive framework A if there exists a consistent set of abducibles
a ⊆ A such that A ∈ Cn(a).
A correspondence was presented between abductive framework and
production relation in [10], where a production relation corresponds
to a consequence relation of the abductive framework, and the set of
abducives corresponds to the set of propositions that are self-explained
(ϕ⇒ ϕ).
In what follows, we define abductive production relations as a special
case of regular production relations in which we take into account the
role of abducibles.
Definition 16 .
• A proposition ϕ will be called an abducible in a production relation
⇒, if ϕ⇒ ϕ;
• A production relation will be called abductive if it is regular and
satisfies
(Abduction) If ϕ⇒ ψ, then ϕ⇒ θ ⇒ ψ for some abducible θ
This corresponds to the following condition on the corresponding
production operator: for any world α, C(α) = C(α ∩ A), where A is
the set of abducible of ⇒.
Thus, production inference allows to give a syntax-independent rep-
resentation of abductive reasoning, This comes from the fact that ab-
ducibles are not defined as a distinguished set of propositions, but
logically as propositions that satisfy certain property (in this case re-
flexivity).
The well-known ’wet grass’ example [55] can be used as an example
to illustrate the uses of abductive relations.
Example 4 Assume that an abductive system ⇒ is determined by the
set ∆ of rules
Rained⇒ Grasswet
Sprinkler⇒ Grasswet
Rained⇒ Streetwet
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and the set abducibles
A = {Rained,¬Rained, Sprinklers,¬Sprinklers,¬Grasswet}
In this example, Rained is an independent parameter since both
Rained and ¬Rained are abducible and hence, self explained (the same
goes for Sprinkler), also ¬Grasswet does not require any explanation.
However Grasswet will demand explanation, i.e. Under a general non-
monotonic semantics interpretation, any exact theory of⇒ that verifies
Grasswet will need to verify either Rained or sprinkler
One possible way to construct an abductive production relation is
to extract it from a regular production relation by identifying a set
of abducibles, and restricting it to the subrelation that satisfies the
abduction rule.
So, Given a production relation ⇒, we define the following produc-
tion relation
ϕ⇒a ψ ≡ (∃θ)(ϕ⇒ θ ⇒ θ ⇒ ψ)
Theorem 19 If ⇒ is a regular production relation, then ⇒a is the
greatest abductive production relation included in ⇒.
A regular production relation and its abductive subrelation share
some similar properties like conserving the same abducibles, the same
axioms, and the same constraints. Also, using the general nonmono-
tonic semantics amounts to accepting the explanatory closure assump-
tion, i.e. that any accepted proposition, need to be explained. Which
also means in the case of either a finite set of proposition, or infinite set
of proposition with a finite number of equivalent classes, one is ensured
to encounter abducible within any production chain. We can conclude
that in many regular cases, the general nonmonotonic semantics of a
production relation should coincide with the semantics of its abductive
subrelation.
Definition 17 A production relation will be called quasi-abductive if
it is nonmonotonically equivalent to its abductive subrelation.
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A more general way to identify quasi-abductive production relation
is to use a property that guarantee the presence of an abducible, in
any ’chain’ of production.
Definition 18 A regular production relation ⇒ will be called well-
founded if any infinite sequence {ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · } of propositions such
that ϕn+1 ⇒ ϕn , for every n ≥ 0, contains an abducible.
We recall that a regular production relation is finitary if it is a least
regular production relation containing some finite causal theory
Theorem 20 Any finitary regular production relation is well-founded.
The following theorem ties it all:
Theorem 21 Any well-founded regular production relation is quasi-
abductive.
The framework of abductive production relations seems well suited
to extend the trust framework that we presented in the last chapter
by providing a way to explicit which belief of the truster explained his
trust. Such beliefs can be seen as abducibles, observation and prior
knowledge about the trustee.
Another possible extension of our precedent work is to study how
trust affects the truster beliefs. Either as a primitive abducible, or
associated to some contextual (core belief). In this context, trust can
be seen as a way to specify, another channel of knoweldge acquisition
(that can be subjective in nature).
In order to study trust in this framework, a last task need to be
achieved, which is to adapt abductive production relations, to our sub-
ject vie of agency, this will be done in the next section.
3.3 Epistemic production inference rela-
tions
In this section, we we present our contribution as an extension of
Bochman’s production relations. Our goal is to present a framework
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that extends our ABC, to work with the epistemic knowlege of specif
agents.
The logical consequence relation of ABC logic and its related closure
operator will be denoted respectively |=ABC and ThABC, we drop the
subscript "ABC " for convenience. We also recall that ABC logic’s
formulas are interpreted under the set of pointed models PM.
Given an agent i, we define an epistemic consequence relation |=i as
a 4-ary relation, such that for any two pairs of formulas (ϕ1, ϕ2) and
(ψ1, ψ2)
(ϕ1, ϕ2) |=i (ψ1, ψ2) iff for any pm ∈ PM,
pm |= Certϕ1 ∧ Plausϕ2 implies pm |= Certiψ1 ∧ Plausiψ2
The entailement operator will be denoted Thi
We define Epistemic production relations, as 4-ary relations defined
on LABC, that associate to an epistemic state of an ABC agent, a second
epistemic state.
This means that the definitive epistemic state of an agent can no
longer be defined by the characterization of his weak and strong belief
relation (BW and BS), his epistemic production relation⇒ineeds also
to be taken in account.
Definition 19 An epistemic production relation associated to an agent
i is a relation ⇒i⊆ (LABC × LABC) × (LABC × LABC) that satisfies the
following properties:
(Strengthening) If θ1, θ2 |=i ϕ1, ϕ2 and (ϕ1, ϕ2) ⇒i (ψ1, ψ2) , then
(θ1, θ2)⇒i (ψ1, ψ2)
(Weakening) If ψ1, ψ2 |=i θ1, θ2 and (ϕ1, ϕ2)⇒i (ψ1, ψ2) ,then (ψ1, ψ2)⇒i
(θ1, θ2)
(And) If (ϕ1, ϕ2)⇒i (ψ1, ψ2) and (ϕ1, ϕ2)⇒i (θ1, θ2) ,then (ϕ1, ϕ2)⇒i
(ψ1 ∧ θ1, ψ2 ∧ θ2)
(Truth) (>,>)⇒i (>,>)
(Falsity) (⊥,⊥)⇒i (⊥,⊥)
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(Plaus-weakening) If ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2 then ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i >, ψ1
(Necessitation) If (ϕ1, ϕ2)⇒i (ψ1, ψ2) ,then (ϕ1, ϕ2)⇒i (Certiψ2, Plausiψ)
We will call ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2 an epistemic production rule.
We extend this notion of rule to sets of premises as follows: given
two sets of LABC formulas, Γ and Ψ:
(Γ,Ψ)⇒i (ϕ, ψ) iff (∧Γ′,∧Ψ′)⇒i (ϕ, ψ)
for some finite sets Γ′ ⊆ Γ and Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ
The next step in adapting production relation to an epistemic view,
is to define a corresponding production operator Ci associated to the
agent i. For any pair 〈Γ,Ψ〉 of sets of formulas, Ci(Γ,Ψ) denotes the
pair of sets of formulas produced by 〈Γ,Ψ〉, that is:
Ci(Γ,Ψ) = {〈ϕ, ψ〉 | (Γ,Ψ)⇒ (ϕ, ψ)}
Lemma 22 The production operator Ci of an epistemic production
relation is deductively closed under the entailment operator of ABC
logic, i.e., Ci(Γ,Ψ) = 〈Θc,Θp〉, implies that Θc = ThABC(Θc) and
Θp = ThABC(Θp)
Proof 4 Suppose Ci(Γ,Ψ) = (Θ, χ) and suppose θ ∈ ThABC(Θ). Then
{theta1, . . . , θn} |= θ for some finite subset {theta1, . . . , θn} of Θ such
that (θk, χk ∈ Ci(Γ,Ψ) for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. The latter means that for every
k there are finite Γk and Ψk such that (
∧Γk,∧Ψk)⇒i (θk, χk) for some
χk. Then by (And) we have (
∧Γk,∧Ψk) ⇒i (∧k θk,∧k χk). Finally,
(∧Γk,∧Ψk)⇒i (θ,∧k χk) by (Weakening). Therefore θ ∈ Θ.
The proof for the plausibility part of the inference is similar.
Our production operator is also monotonic.
Lemma 23 If Γ′ ⊆ Γ and Ψ′ ⊆ Ψ , then Ci(Γ′,Θ) ⊆ Ci(Γ,Θ) and
Ci(Θ,Ψ) ⊆ Ci(Θ,Ψ′) for any set of formulas Θ.
Proof 5 Suppose Γ′ ⊇ Γ and suppose (θ, χ) in Ci(Γ,Ψ). Then (Γ,Ψ)⇒i
(θ, χ), i.e., (∧Γ0,∧Ψ0) ⇒i (θ, χ) for some finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ and Ψ0 ⊆ Ψ.
By definition we then also have (Γ′,Ψ)⇒i (θ, χ), i.e., θ, χ in Ci(Γ′,Ψ).
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Still, the operator is not inclusive, neither it is idempotent (for ex-
ample, let Γ = Ψ be the set of ABC theorems and let Θ = χ be the set
of all ABC formulas.)
In order to define the semantics of our epistemic production rela-
tions, we will both present a syntactic (formulas based) and semantics
(model based) semantics.
Definition 20 We will call four consistent deductively closed sets an
epistemic bimodel(abbreviated ebimodel). A set of ebimodels will be
called a ABC epistemic binary semantics.
We will use the notation (u1, u2)E(v1, v2) to denote the fact that the
ebimodel (u1, u2, v1, v2) belongs to the epistemic binary semantics E.
An equivalent semantics based on the set of pointed models PM
can be defined as follow:
〈Γc,Γp,Ψc,Ψp〉 ≡ 〈{pm ∈ PM | pm |=ABC Certiγ, for any γ ∈ Γc
and pm |=ABC Plausiγ′, for any γ′ ∈ Γp}
, {pm ∈ PM | pm |=ABC Certiψ, for any ψ ∈ Ψc
and pm |=ABC Plausiψ′, for any ψ′ ∈ Ψc}〉
Since both formulations of the semantics can be interchangeable, we
will use the most convenient one to simplify our proofs.
We have now all the necessary ingredients to define the notion of
validity.
Definition 21 An epistemic production rule ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2 will be
said to be valid in an epistemic binary semantics E, if for any ebimodel
〈u1, u2, v1, v2〉 from E, ϕ1 ∈ u1 and ϕ2 ∈ u2, only if ψ1 ∈ v1 and ψ2 ∈ v2.
Just as for production relations, an epistemic binary semantics char-
acterizes a specific epistemic production relation.
Lemma 24 For any epistemic binary semantics E, the associated set
of epistemic production rules that are valid in E, is an epistemic pro-
duction relation (that we will denote ⇒Ei)
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A completeness result can be obtained by constructing for any epis-
temic production relation ⇒i, its canonical semantics
E⇒i = {〈u1, u2, Ci(u1, u2)〉}
Theorem 25 If E⇒i is the epistemic canonical semantics for an epis-
temic production relation ⇒i, then for any sets of propositions Γ and
Ψ and any pair of formulas ϕ, ψ:
Γ,Ψ⇒i ϕ, ψ iff ϕ ∈ v1 and ψ ∈ v2, for any ebimodel (u1, u2, v1, v2) ∈
E⇒i such that Γ ⊆ u1 and Ψ ⊆ u2
Corollary 26 A 4-ary relation ⇒on LABC formulas is an epistemic
production inference associated to the agent i, if and only if it is de-
termined by an epistemic binary semantics.
We will use the notion of epistemic causal theory, as an arbitrary set
of epistemic production rules. It should be noted again that the notion
of causality is associated to the epistemic state of an agent, comprising
strong and weak beliefs, this means that such notion of causality is
subjective in nature.
We also point out that the notion of causality as defined here, is not
temporal, 〈ϕ, .〉 ⇒i 〈ψ, .〉 does not means that i strongly believes that ϕ
occurred before ψ, but rather that i would associate to the observation
of ψ (under no specific context), ϕ as an explanation. This vision
defines a hierarchy of dependencies that will be of great use for us,
when we will try to use trust and how it can be used to explain the
agent’s beliefs. The same remark applies to weak beliefs.
Epistemic causal theories can be used to construct epistemic pro-
duction relations. Let ∆(Γ,Ψ) denote the set of all production rules
that can be directly produced from 〈Γ,Ψ〉 by ∆, that is
∆(Γ,Ψ) = {〈ψ1, ψ2〉 | ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2 for some ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ Γ,Ψ}
We will adopt the following description of ⇒i∆, for the epistemic pro-
duction relation that is generated by ∆:
Proposition 9 C∆(Γ,Θ) = Thi(∆(Thi(Γ,Θ)))
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3.3.1 Regular epistemic production inference
A regular epistemic production relation is an epistemic production re-
lation that satisfies the cut rule.
Cut if ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2 and ϕ1 ∧ ψ1, ϕ2 ∧ ψ2 ⇒i θ1, θ2, then ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i
θ1, θ2
This is equivalent to the following property of the operator:
Ci(Γ ∪ C1,Ψ ∪ C2) ⊆ Ci(Γ,Ψ)
where Ci(Γ,Ψ) = 〈C1, C2〉.
Adding the cut rule makes some other properties hold:
Transitivity If ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2 and ψ1, ψ2 ⇒i θ1, θ2, then ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i
θ1, θ2
Constraint If ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2, then ϕ1 ∧ ¬ψ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ⊥, ψ2 and
ϕ1, ϕ2 ∧ ¬ψ2 ⇒i ψ1,⊥
This property introduced a new kind of productions ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i
⊥, ψ2 and ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1,⊥ as a way to describe purely factual
information. By saying that ϕ1 (resp. ϕ2), is explanatory incon-
sistent w.r.t. the agents i strong (resp. weak) belief. We will call
this special kind of rules, strong and weak contraints.
Coherence If ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ¬ϕ1, ψ2, then ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ⊥, ψ2. The same
goes for the second premise of the rule. Which are special kind of
contraints expressing that if a production is not compatible with
its antecedents, then it is explanatory inconsistent.
Definition 22 .
A pair of sets of ABC formulas 〈Γ,Ψ〉 is a theory of an epistemic
production relation, if it is deductively closed, and Ci(Γ,Ψ) ⊆ 〈Γ,Ψ〉.
Furthermore, theories that describe a unique pair of belief relations
BSi, BWi —special classes of models in ABC logic, where we have the
same belief relation for the agent i— are simple to characterize. We
105
will call such theory, an epistemic theory. Using theories shows that
we are interested in rearranging beliefs using the notion of explanation
that is coded within the production relation, we are not generating
knoweldge
Lemma 27 An epistemic theory 〈Γ,Ψ〉 for the agent i is a theory of
a regular epistemic production relation, if an only if Γ,Ψ 6⇒i ϕ,⊥ and
Γ,Ψ 6⇒i ⊥, ψ, for any formulas ϕ and ψ.
Regular epistemic production relations can be characterized using
only inclusive ebimodels (〈u1, u2, v1, v2〉 such that v1 ⊆ u1 and v2 ⊆ u2).
The corresponding semantics will be called and inclusive epistemic
binary semantics.
Theorem 28 ⇒iis a regular epistemic production relation if and only
if it is generated by an inclusive epistemic binary semantics.
We will denote⇒ri∆, the least regular production relation containing
an epistemic causal theory ∆. We can obtain a constructive charac-
terization of ⇒ri∆using the theorem above.
Proposition 10 Γ,Ψ⇒ri∆ ϕ, ψ if and only if, 〈ϕ, ψ〉 ∈ Thi(∆(u1, u2)),
for any ∆-theory 〈u1, u2〉, such that Γ,Ψ ⊆ 〈u1, u2〉.
Corollary 29
Cri∆(Γ,Ψ) = Thi(∆(Cle(Γ,Ψ)))
where Cle(Γ,Ψ) is the least epistemic ∆-theory containing
〈Γ,Ψ〉.
The next thing to do, is to define a proper notion of equivalence,
that allows us to define classes of interchangeable formulas in produc-
tion rules. Two formulas are certainly (resp. plausibly) equivalent if
>, ϕ2 ⇒i ϕ ↔ ψ, ψ2 (resp. ϕ1,> ⇒i ψ1, ϕ ↔ ψ), for any formulas
ϕ1, ϕ2, ψ1, ψ2.
Lemma 30 If two formulas are certainly (resp. plausibly) equivalent
in ⇒i, they can be interchangeable within the left (resp. right) occur-
rences in any rules of ⇒i.
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Like production relations, epistemic production relations can charac-
terize a nonmonotonic semantics, where nonmonotonicity is a byprod-
uct of the lack of reflexivity we will talk here about left and right
reflexivity of the production operator.
Definition 23 .
• A pair of sets of formulas 〈Γ,Ψ〉 is called an exact epistemic theory
if it is consistent and 〈Γ,Ψ〉 = Ci(Γ,Ψ)
• A pair of sets 〈Γ,Ψ〉 of formulas is an exact epistemic theory of
a causal epistemic theory ∆ if it is an exact epistemic theory of
⇒i∆.
• A general epistemic nonmonotonic semantics of a production in-
ference relation of an epistemic production relation (or a causal
epistemic theory) is the set of all its exact theories.
By restricting our attention to exact semantics, we are accepting
the explanatory closure assumption, meaning that all formulas are pro-
duced (or explained) in final states.
Still, the notion of validity can be defined in different manners.
The nonmonotonicity comes from the fact that excluding non-exact
epistemic theories, makes the process of adding new rules, changes the
semantics of a relation in a nonmonotonic way.
Also, exact epistemic theories are fix points of the production op-
erator Ci, and since this operator is monotonic and continuous, exact
epistemic theories (and hence non monotonic epistemic semantics) al-
way exists. For regular epistemic production relations, the least exact
theory coincides with Ci(>,>). In addition, the union of any chain
of exact epistemic theories, (with respect to set inclusion), is an ex-
act epistemic theory, so any exact epistemic theory is included in a
maximal such theory.
Lemma 31 If⇒iis a regular epistemic production relation, and 〈Γ,Ψ〉 ⊆
Ci(Γ,Ψ), then Ci(Γ,Ψ) is an exact theory of ⇒i.
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An equivalent lemma can be defined for causal theories
Lemma 32 〈Γ,Ψ〉 is an exact epistemic theory of a causal theory ∆
if and only if 〈Γ,Ψ〉 = Ci(∆(Γ,Ψ))
Regular epistemic production relations are an adequate and maximal
logic framework for reasoning with exact epistemic theories.
Definition 24 Two causal epistemic theories will be called nonmono-
tonically equivalent if they have the same general nonmonotonic se-
mantics.
The next lemma links epistemic causal theories and regular epis-
temic production relations under the general nonmonotonic epistemic
semantics.
Lemma 33 Any causal epistemic theories ∆ is nonmonotonically equiv-
alent to ⇒ri∆.
The two notions of equivalent may be linked
Corollary 34 Regulary equivalent theories are nonmonotonically equiv-
alent
But the converse does not hold (adding rules does change the non-
monotonic semantics in an unpredictable way). We need a stronger
monotonic equivalence notion, in order to have an equivalence to the
nonmonotonic semantics.
Definition 25 Two epistemic causal theories ∆ and ∆′ will be called
strongly equivalent, if for any set Θ of causal epistemic rules, ∆ ∪ Θ
is nonmonotonically equivalent to ∆′ ∪Θ.
Such kind of equivalence is a context-free equivalence between epis-
temic causal theories.
We can show that all those notions of equivalence are the same
actually. As a final result, we show that:
Theorem 35 Two epistemic theories are strongly equivalent if and
only if they are regularly equivalent.
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Just as in the propositional case, production relations are maximal
inference relations that are adequate for reasoning with causal theories.
Exact theories are also fixed points, where beliefs are augmented
with a hierarchy of causality relation, represented by the production
relation. Lets take a look at how Abductive reasoning can be imple-
mented in such framework.
3.3.2 Abductive epistemic inference
In this section, we will adapt Bochman’s abductive reasoning to the
epistemic case of ABC. Our goal is to propose a framework that models
how an agent would associate abducibles to his beliefs.
We recall that an abductive framework is a pair A = (Cn,A) where
Cn is a consequence relation and A is a set of abducibles. In our
framework abducibles are couples of ABC formulas. We adopt the
same definition of explanability by saying that a pair of formulas are
explained if there is a set a ⊆ A such that Cn(a) includes it.
We define an abductive epistemic production relation as a regular
relation that satisfies the abduction principle.
Definition 26 .
• A pair of formulas 〈ϕ, ψ〉 will be called an abducible in an epistemic
production relation ⇒i, if ϕ, ψ ⇒i ϕ, ψ;
• An epistemic production relation will be called abductive epistemic
if it is regular and satisfies:
(Abduction) if ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2, then ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i θ1, θ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2,
for some abducible 〈θ1, θ2〉.
The abduction condition corresponds to the following restriction on
the production operator:
for any epistemic theory Ci(〈Γ,Ψ〉) = Ci(〈Γ,Ψ〉 ∪ A)
where A is the set of abducibles of ⇒i.
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Given an epistemic production relation ⇒i, we will define the fol-
lowing production relation:
ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ai ψ1, ψ2 ≡ (∃〈θ1, θ2〉)(ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒i θ1, θ2 ⇒i θ1, θ2 ⇒i ψ1, ψ2)
Theorem 36 if⇒iis a regular production relation, then⇒ai is the great-
est abductive production relation included in ⇒i.
Epistemic abductive subrelations preserve some properties of the
original relation, like sharing the same constraints, axioms and ab-
ducibles.
By accepting the explanatory closure assumption, we ensure that in
cases where the used set of formulas is finite, we cannot derogate from
using abducibles. This means that many regular relations coincide
with their abductive subrelation.
Definition 27 An epistemic production relation will be called quasi-
abductive if it coincide with its abductive subrelation.
Now a condition for quasi-abducibility
Definition 28 A regular epistemic production relation will be called
well-founded, if any infinite senquence {〈ϕ0, ψ0〉, 〈ϕ1, ψ1〉, 〈ϕ2, ψ2〉, · · · }
of couples of formulas, such that ϕn+1, ψn+1 ⇒i ψn, ψn, for any n ≥ 0,
contains an abducible.
A regular epistemic production relation is finitary if it is a least
regular production relation that contain some finite causal epistemic
theories.
Theorem 37 Any finitary regular production is well-founded
And finally,
Theorem 38 Any well-founded regular production relation is quasi-
abductive.
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3.4 Nonmonotonic vision of trust
In the last chapter, we presented a formalization of trust as a special
kind of belief about a context of interaction. Our ABC logic offers
tools to test if an agent has this kind of belief, given his epistemic
state. Nonetheless, by its operational nature, trust should be viewed
as a special kind of belief, different in nature from an agent’s other
types of beliefs, for example, in many cases, trust is generated by
heuristical interpretation of social norms. Such social norms make us
believe that any agent wearing a police uniform would help us. This
kind of belief should be distinguishable from belief that is directly
acquired for example, like observing that the sky is blue.
In this section, we will use our abductive relation both to separate
what we will call trust belief from core belief, and define a hierarchy
of explanability, that allows us to associate to each belief the agent has,
an origin from his core or trust belief.
In our view an agent’s epistemic state will be divided into:
A core belief , that represents what an agent would assume about
the actual interaction context. Such beliefs can be either acquired
by observation or interaction,
A trust based belief or trust belief, is a special kind of belief, that
represents the agent trust assumptions. Separating it from core
belief allow us to manipulate such special kind of belief in a special
way. It also emphasizes the fact that trust can be based on other
metrics and assumptions than the core beliefs (like different social
conventions,etc.), and
A production relation , that links core belief and trust based belief,
in order to form the current epistemic state of the agent. The
production relation will also provide us with a way to describe
how to define a causal dependency between these different type
of beliefs, in a way that represents how trust may be used (to
implement abductive tasks).
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The interaction between core and trust beliefs may differ from an
agent to another. Depending on the use of the production relation, we
identify three types of interactions:
Core based trust: The first vision sees core trust, as the origin of
the trust belief, trust is then used to explain the agent’s beliefs.
trust as elemental belief: Trust is an elemental type of belief, that
explains any belief of the agent except his core belief, which is
taken as self explanatory.
contextual trust: Trust assertions are actually used in parallel with
the core knoweldge to justify beliefs.
In what will follow, we will present how we can use epistemic abduc-
tive relations to deploy these three kinds of epistemic state. Then we
will present how we can integrate our production relations into ABC
logic.
3.4.1 Core based trust
In chapter 2, we defined trust as a special kind of belief that is associ-
ated to the current state of belief of the truster. Our core based trust
approach assumes that trust can explain all the formulas compatible
with the agent’s epistemic state. Trust assertions are seen as abducibles
then. As for trust assertion, they are themselves explainable using the
core belief of the agent.
We will denote by Ci ⊆ PM the core beliefs of the agent i, and Ti ⊆
PM the trust belief. We should note that a syntactic reformulation
can be obtained by defining Csi = {〈ϕ, ψ〉 | Ci |=ABC Certiϕ∧Plausiψ}
and Tsi = {〈ϕ, ψ〉 | Ti |=ABC Certiϕ ∧ Plausiψ}. This reformulation
helps us define the set of formulas upon which our solution will define
an abductive relation using the entailment operator of ABC logic, cor-
responding to the epistemic state of i: Ci∪Ti, related to the syntactic
reformulation Thi(Csi ∪ Tsi).
Our abductive framework is then a regular production relation, de-
fined on the set of formulas Thi(Csi ∪ Tsi), such that we define two
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sets of abducibles: AT and AC of resp. trust and core abducibles.
We are interested in such abductive relation ⇒that are refinement of
Bochman’s abduction constraint:
Abduction* if ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ ψ1, ψ2 then there is 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ AC and 〈t1, t2〉 ∈
AT such that: ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ c1, c2 ⇒ t1, t2 ⇒ ψ1, ψ2
This corresponds to the abductive framework presented in the last
section, with the introduction of two sets of abducibles.
Given the fact that an abductive relation can be defined using a
causal theory (a set of production relations), we can define a new epis-
temic state of an agent, that integrates an abduction mechanism based
on core based trust as follows:
Definition 29 (Core based trust Epistemic state(ECT )) A core trust
based epistemic state of an agent i, is a structure 〈T,C,AC ,AT ,∆〉,
where:
• T ⊆ PM are the trust beliefs of i.
• C ⊆ PM the core belief of i.
• ∆ is a set of production rules on formulas of ABC logic.
• AC,ATare sets of ABC formulas, such that AC ∪ AT is the set of
abducibles of the abductive relation ⇒ai∆ associated to ∆ such that
⇒ai∆satisfies abduction*.
3.4.2 Trust as an elemental belief
In many cases, it is advantageous to see trust as a primitive artifact,
that cannot be reduced, nor explained using other objects of an in-
teraction theory. In this second reformulation of an agent’s epistemic
state, trust suffices to explain the agent’s epistemic state assertions,
except for the core belief, which is seen as self-explained.
Definition 30 Elemental Epistemic state(EEL)] the elemental epistemic
state of an agent i, is a structure 〈T,C,AC ,AT ,∆〉, where:
• T ⊆ PM are the trust beliefs of i.
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• C ⊆ PM are the core beliefs of i.
• ∆ is a set of production rules on formulas of ABC logic.
• AC,ATare sets of ABC formulas, such that AC ∪ AT is the set of
abducibles of the abductive relation⇒ai∆ associated to ∆ satisfying:
if ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ ψ1, ψ2 with 〈ψ1, ψ2〉 ∈ Thi(Csi ∪ Tsi) \ Csi, there is a
〈t1, t2〉 ∈ AT such that: ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ t1, t2 ⇒ ψ1, ψ2, else, there is
a 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ AT such that: ϕ1, ϕ2 ⇒ c1, c2 ⇒ ψ1, ψ2
Assuming a system where agents are based on elemental epistemic
states, assumes that an agent will base his abductive framework upon
trust. It also means that adding elements to core knowledge will ex-
pand to the epistemic state only in ways that are compatible with a
trust-based explanation.
3.4.3 Contextual trust
A more admissible way to think about a trust based abductive frame-
work, is to define the use of trust as contextual to the basic assumption
about the current world. This differentiation between what is often
called absolute and circumstantial trust can only be modeled if the
current influence of the core belief, upon how trust is interpreted, is
explicitly defined by the agent.
We will implement this in the form of families of parametrized ab-
ductive relations
The set of abducibles is A ⊆ Csi × Tsi where abducibles take the
form 〈c1 ∧ t1, c2 ∧ t2〉.
Definition 31 (contextual Epistemic state(ECN)) the elemental epis-
temic state of an agent i, is a structure 〈T,C,AC ,AT ,∆〉, where:
• T ⊆ PM are the trust beliefs of i.
• C ⊆ PM are the core beliefs of i.
• ∆ a set of production rules defines upon the formulas of ABC logic.
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• AC,ATare sets of ABC formulas, such that AC ×AT is the set of
abducibles of the abductive relation⇒ai∆ associated to ∆ satisfying:
if 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉 ⇒ 〈ψ1, ψ2〉 then There is 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ AC and 〈t1, t2〉 ∈ AT
such that: 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉 ⇒ 〈c1 ∧ t1, c2 ∧ t2〉 ⇒ 〈ψ1, ψ2〉
The main change that should be forced, is that the user needs to
define his causal theory, using parametrized rules.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we presented a nonmonotonic vision of trust that ex-
tends the trust belief principle presented in chapter 2. This nonmono-
tonic vision divides trust models into two elements, a set of atomic
assumptions assimilated to abducibles in abductive frameworks, and a
function that transforms beliefs according to those trust assumptions,
which is a conditional and epistemic variant of production relations.
This separation provides a better understanding of the process of
trust integration. Trust assumptions are objects of trust, while the
related production relation is how the agent actually uses trust in his
way of reasoning. This provide us with an interesting model of trust,
that may be extended in future work.
In this investigation, we introduced a new way to model belief re-
vision based on epistemic production relations. We can see that we
can use this method in a framework to include knowledge of different
kind and different sources, while separating how to integrate it. Still,
priority between those different kind of belief need to be studied.
However, this approach to trust assumes that atomic trust asser-
tions and the production relation are inputs of the model, those two
objects characterize how an agent has integrated trust in his process of
constructing a mental image of. One may see this process as a result
of the agent experience and own effort to induce general rules about
how to interact.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and
conclusion
In this work, we presented a general study of computational trust based
on two main claims: trust studies need to be more methodical, which
can only be possible by assuming an applicative perception of trust.
When applied in complex situations, trust objects need to be explain-
able, or at least well described in a way that helps the truster construct
his decision process upon it in a sound manner.
Following this two claim, we started by presenting a general survey of
computational trust. We focused on finding different parallels between
trust models in the literature , either by sharing a common trust theory,
a field of application, or a theory of instantiation. Such parallels helped
us defining a set of research tracks, that we deem important to tackle
in order to help the discipline grow.
Due to the applicative incentive to study trust, most of the promi-
nent models are based on ad hoc optimization. Such an approach to
studying trust may give short term results, but in the long run, a
methodology to study trust is needed in order to be able to construct
upon past studies in a modular way. This can only be done by a mod-
ular approach to define the component of trust management systems,
and defining testbeds that are both meaningful from an applicative
point of view and not specific to a unique category of trust models.
We presented then two trust models, meant to represent trust in the
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context of multi-agent systems based on cognitive agents. In our first
model, we started by proposing a dynamic epistemic logic, with two
belief operators and a choice operator, joined with two dynamic oper-
ators used to express action composition to represent the multi-agent
system. Atomic actions are interpreted as authored assignments, which
allows us to make a direct parallel to standard notions of computation
like programs or services. We used this framework to present a trust
definition that instantiates Castelfranchi&Falcone socio-cognitive trust
theory, as a special kind of epistemic state of the truster about the ca-
pacity of the trustees to achieve some task, viewed as a composition
of actions. After illustrating how trust in such composed action an be
retrieved from trust in atomic actions, we illustrated the usage of our
logic in a study case, related to service-oriented architectures, where
composed actions are related to service composition.
Our second trust model presents in an attempt to extend our first
model of trust, to support trust based abductive reasoning. To do
so, we extended Bochman’s production relations to work with an epis-
temic language. Since Bochman’s framework was designed to study
the notion of causality as a nonmonotonic reasoning concept, our def-
inition of trust became a special case of causal reasoning, applied to
social interactions. Our framework was then used to present our views
on how trust can be used as abducibles, to explain the agents beliefs,
or as a consequence of the agents observation and a priori knowledge
about the system.
Possible extensions of our work can be of two nature: applicative
and theoretical.
Applicative extension that we hope to pursue are:
Defining formal service-oriented architecture: our dynamic epis-
temic logic offers the necessary expressiveness that one can desire
to implement SOA solutions. Our framework should be usable to
express service composition, service orchestration, and the content
of contract of service between service providers and service con-
sumers. We also believe that our logic offers the necessary tools
to implement protocols of interaction, that tackle both functional
and security aspects of online interactions, as illusttrated in our
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case study.
Defining personal information management systems: our trust
model can be used as basis to implement a suggestion module, that
a service provider can offer to a user that would interact in risky
environment to help him assess threats related to his preserving
his privacy and manage access to his personal informations. Such
module can be of use in social networks, where suggestions on how
and with whom to share information can be crucial to avoid cy-
ber crime, like information theft, cyber fraud, identity usurpation,
cyber bullying, etc.
Theoretical extension of our work that we would like to pursue are:
Studying the complexity of ABC logic: while we did prove the de-
cidability of our logic, in oder to emphasize its usability to imple-
ment real solution, we need to prove the tractability of our logic.
Such results will also further our understanding fo both dynamic
epistemic logic class of complexity and the influence of assignment
based action, in the tractability of complex dynamic logics.
Extending the set of action constructor in ABC logic: The main
drawback of ABC logic, is the lack of a Kleene star, which allow
to implement loops. New operators would help us describe more
complex action composition. Our goal is to get closer to service
composition languages that are already in use (like BPEL [62] for
example).
Proofs of claims regarding our abductive framework: While the
main claims of the last chapter are still conjecture, we intend to
provide their formal proof in future works. We also intend to de-
fine a more natural interpretation of production relation within
modal languages.
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